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INTRODUCTION 
The Center for the Study of Democracy has undertaken a special inquiry into the
topic of drug abuse—which was fueled by the drug epidemic of the late 1990s and
has grown to become a real social threat—and the problem of drug dealing, which is
a major mechanism for the generation of organized crime in Bulgaria. This study
attempts to assess of the actual risks posed to Bulgaria in the last few years. It also
aims to provide reliable information which is “essential for underpinning the new
drug strategies and policies that are under development in all acceding and candidate
countries.”1
This report addresses drug supply and demand in Bulgaria with the ambition of
mapping a vast information void and identifying the basic mechanisms and
stakeholders of the drug market. However, the peculiarities of drug diffusion and
consumption do not allow the use of the standard suite of economic research tools
and vehicles throughout the study.
This analysis has been divided into three sections. The first addresses the genesis
of drug distribution, while the second describes its structure and functioning. The
findings about supply presented in the first two parts are based on all sources the
research team has been able to access. The main source was a series of in-depth
interviews with dealers of different groups of drugs, long-term drug users, with police
and security officers (experienced in combating drug traffic, drug production, and
drug dealing), doctors, and civil organizations engaged in treatment services to drug
addicts. Certain case studies offered by law enforcement bodies, as well as relevant
journalistic investigations and media analyses, were also drawn upon. 
Section 3 highlights drug demand, and brings into play the findings of the First
National Population Survey on Drug Consumption in Bulgaria conducted by Vitosha
Research. For the purpose of this study, CSD and Vitosha Research used the research
tools of the European Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).
While paying attention to a variety of views, the team of authors has tried to find
common ground upon which to evaluate the actual number of drug users in the
country. Even if population-based surveys are often unreliable due to stigmatized and
hidden patterns of drug use, they are the type of surveys that provide a
comprehensive representation of the situation in the country, as well as reference
material for later in-depth studies. 
In addition, a series of indirect variables, tailored to Bulgarian circumstances, were
drawn up to register psychoactive substance use. Two more surveys, of the qualitative
type, were conducted: one among heroin addicts and frequent users of soft drugs,
and another among experts and treatment agencies. 
1 2003 EMCDDA report on candidate countries - http://candidates.emcdda.eu.int/en/home-en.html
This report was developed by the Center for the Study of Democracy as part of a
project evaluating the patterns of drug supply and demand in Bulgaria. It embodies
the research and discussion of a task force with the following members: Tihomir
Bezlov, CSD Senior Research Fellow; Ivan Tsvetkov, Director of Drugs Sector,
National Service for Combating Organized Crime; Christo Terziysky, Head of Drugs
Department, Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs; Dr. Yulian Karadjov, Senior
Research Fellow, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; Anita Bossilkova, Deputy Chair,
Municipal Council on Narcotics, Sofia; Elena Yankova, Initiative for Health
Foundation; Assya Stoyanova, Panacea Foundation, Plovdiv; Nadia Dragieva, Dose
of Love Association, Bourgas; Dr. Nedyu Georgiev, 21 Century Foundation, Pleven. 
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1. THE GENESIS OF DRUG USE AND ABUSE IN BULGARIA
The use of hemp and opium was widespread even at the beginning of the 20
th
century, yet it rarely went beyond sporadic/medical use. Marijuana had mainly
medicinal application, although there is evidence of recreational use as well. In some
areas—like the Southwest of Bulgaria—opium (or “afion,” the Turkish word used by
the locals) was traditionally cultivated for export. It was used as a means to comfort
babies, but as a result of certain political measures this custom died out toward mid-
20
th
century. Although opiate dependency was generally perceived as a deviation,
afion fiends were more often ridiculed than condemned. Drug use up to mid-20th
century was concentrated in the rural areas where drugs were produced.
Urbanization brought that tradition to an end. 
As the 1960s approached, non-medicinal illicit drug use in Bulgaria was still an
exception to the rule. Apparently, the only group of addicts were medical opiate
users who treated their chronic pain with opium, davilla tincture, morphine, or
lidocaine. Experts estimate the number of addicts prior to 1968 at 100 people.
1.1. MEDICAL OPIATES, TRANQUILIZERS, AMPHETAMINES (1968 – 1990)
The first cases of non-medicinal opiate use among young people in Bulgaria were
recorded at the end of the sixties, and—as revealed in interviews with long-time users
and former Ministry of Interior (MoI) officials and in certain records from that time—
the 1968 International Youth Festival in Sofia was its catalyst. In Europe and the USA,
psychoactive substances, in particular marijuana, were one of the symbols of
alternative youth culture. Most probably, Bulgarian youth participating in the festival
had the chance to taste this chemistry of pleasure amid the numerous motley parties.
Until then, Bulgaria had been one of the most hermetic states of the Soviet bloc, so
the festival was the first chance for people to make contacts with those from beyond
the Iron Curtain. 
As the rural type of marijuana use had nearly died out, young people willing to
expand their experience with drugs were driven into the orbit of medical opiates. The
low price and unproblematic access to these drugs made them the natural choice of
the first wave of dependent opiate users in the country.
Another source of drug dependency emerged in the 1970s, as the children of
Bulgarians working abroad returned home and formed closed circles of users; they
did not offer drugs out of the circle for fear of disclosure. Nevertheless, a permanent,
though slow, increase of the number of registered dependent persons could be
observed after 1975. A subculture of drug users, whose core value was the passive
rejection of official ideology, was gradually forming in the larger cities, mostly the
capital, Sofia. The state responded by clamping down on schools, universities, and
medical institutions. Addicts were put through extreme treatment and forced into
mental institutions. Medical opiates were placed under special control.2 This pushed
addicts to seek other sources of psychoactive substances, i.e. the non-controlled
medicaments in the late 1970s. A popular “tea” was made from poppy straw, a waste
product that could be bought in the villages in the Pirin mountain, where it is
traditionally grown as a medical and oil-yielding plant. 
Moreover, a black market for medical opiates developed, selling medicines either
stolen or swindled from pharmacies and hospitals. Nothing, however, like organized
crime—that could structure the drug market and profit from existing demand—had
yet crystallized at that time.3 The lack of any specialized police units until
1990 implies that the drug problem was within certain limits and could possibly be
handled by the two drug officers operating in the capital, Sofia, where almost 90%
of opiate users resided.
It should be noted that in contrast to other East European countries, Bulgaria has
a constant external drug risk since the heroin trail to Western Europe runs through it.
According to official statistics, in the late 1980s, record amounts—even for the whole
of Europe—were detained at Bulgarian borders. Yet, there was no heroin within the
country. 
Among the explanations of why Bulgaria was untouched by heroin, we can
underscore the fact that is was impossibile for a large drug market to evolve under a
totalitarian Soviet-style police apparatus. Secret services held the “drug channels”
through the country in check. Western states often hint that these channels might
have been used to harm other states. However, no official statement by Western anti-
drug services considers Bulgaria as a key player in the drug business.
The total number of dependent drug users in Sofia registered at the MoI at the
start of 1990 was 1,300, while those outside of the capital were less than 100. Ministry
of Health figures approximated that those diagnosed with abuse/dependency (ICD-
9, codes 304 and 305) in the mid-1980s was roughly 1400 people.4
Indeed, the non medicinal use of soporifics and tranquilizers was also growing in
that period. In 1980, around 16% of registered addicts stated that these medicaments
were their preferred drug. A large portion of opiate and tranquilizer addicts (36%)
were also addicted to alcohol.
Another trait of the period was the use of amphetamines. They were taken by
university students during the exam season to enhance concentration and brain
effectiveness, i.e. restricted to situations in which their use was considered
indispensable. Amphetamines were perceived as medication and very few consumers
developed a heavy dependency (as little as 2.3% of registered dependent drug users
had a primary diagnosis “abuse of stimulants”) or associated themselves with drug
addicts. With the crackdown on legally produced amphetamines in the late 1980s, their
use dwindled.
2 Control over the amount of opiates doctors are allowed to prescribe, special cases for opiate storage,
prescriptions protected from counterfeit, etc. 
3 It is arguable whether there was any organized crime in Bulgaria up to 1990. 
4 National Report on the drugs situation in Bulgaria, 2000 (ÒÚ. 9)
8 CSD Reports 12
Other mid-80s fads among high school students were crude hallucinogens like
parkisan and glue sniffing. The practice became even wider spread in the following
years to subside ten years later with the appearance of marijuana.
1.2. THE ARRIVAL OF HEROIN (1990-1991)
The fall of 1990 can be pinpointed as
the beginning of heroin use in Sofia. The
long-term opiate users we interviewed
claimed that the earliest source of heroin
were a group of Iranian citizens then
living in the Hemus Hotel in downtown
Sofia. Some of them were political
refugees, supposedly no longer targeted
by the former secret services. “The
Iranians from Hemus” used to take high
quality heroin, whose shipment was
unimpeded by the secret services prior
to 1990. Thus, the contact between
Bulgarian opiate addicts and the Iranian
immigrants was only a matter of time. 
Puzzling out the arrival of heroin
brings to the surface certain causes that
produced inevitable effects. First and
foremost, the political transformations in
the spring and summer of 1990
demoralized the security services, which
slackened control over opiate addicts in
Sofia. As for the Iranian immigrants, the
police refrained from action, assuming
that the case was under the jurisdiction
of the state security service. Second, in
the mid-1990s foreign nationals
transiting through, or temporarily
residing in, the country (Turkish drivers
and retailers form the Middle East), as
well as the agents of trafficking channels
that used to be under surveillance, were
no longer contained. The Iranian refugee
circle likewise rode the wave of change
and startÂd using their personal supply
channels to profit from the emerging
Bulgarian market. 
One could argue that, initially, the
Iranians did not aim at a mass market or
excessive profits. Despite the
considerable amounts of premier quality
heroin, in the first two years, they sold it 
There are several factors that accelerated the spread of heroin in Bulgaria:
1. The dissolution of the Soviet model of total control over society made
access to drugs rather easy and for a time devoid of any risks. 
2. Due to the opening of the country, and the transition to a market economy,
psychoactive substance seekers and providers could exploit the market
mechanisms of the economy of crime. It was only a matter of time before
the supply funneled into the domestic market from the heroin channel that
passed through Bulgaria.
3. A number of small, but well-knit congregations of drug users had formed in
Bulgaria, many valuing opiates over all other drugs. Most of them wanted
to try heroin which had been nearly inaccessible, but had the halo of the
# 1 Drug. This group of 1,200-1,500 people would become the core of the
snowball that would grow exponentially in the 1990s.
4. The shattering of social and economic realities drove a number of people
of various ages to seek oblivion through heroin—it is a  stronger and initially
cheaper substitute for alcohol. This was especially true in some
neighborhoods populated by Roma.
5. The pattern of growth of dependent users in Bulgaria follows the pyramid
effect. Bottom level pushers were often seriously addicted. Since they had
no regular income, they were compelled to find at least 10 clients to secure
their normal fix. Each newly dependent person would, in turn, have to find
their own customers (a strong dependency takes 5 to 6 months to develop).
Due to the pyramid effect, between 1992 and 1996 dependent drug users
increased by 50% a year.
6. Domestic security services had strong bonds with the old political system,
and were subject to political pressure. At the start of transition they lost
most of their social privileges, thus deepening the institutional and
personnel crisis in the security services. Later on, criminal enterprises and
gray economic groups entered the pressure game as well. Thus, the law was
evaded already at all levels of law enforcement—from the regular police
officer to the supreme judge. If street dispersal of heroin was merely
ignored by the police when it first started, even in the mid-1990s law
enforcement officials were engaged in corrupt assistance of drug sales.
7. A huge portion of society was completely ignorant about drugs. As a result,
many young people would risk experimenting with the first drug they came
across.
8. Educational and healthcare institutions continue to regard drug users as a
marginal group of insignificant size. What is commonly meant by
“prevention” is either the widespread notion that the less you speak about
drugs, the better, or the mixed messages that misinform young people
rather than make the risks of drug use clear to them.
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Causes
only to people they knew well and did not deal to strangers, even when offered large
sums. In the late 1990s, other temporary residents joined in the business. Our
interviewees reveal information about Albanians, Kurds, Lebanese, and Turks
marketing small quantities of heroin, who, passing through the country in transit, ran
the risk of selling drugs independently.5 In any event, the main heroin supply for Sofia
came from the Hemus Hotel Iranians. All instances of heroin sales testify to the
existence of “small networks” gravitating around certain individuals rather than
a heroin market methodically set up by international crime groups. It was a minor
market not worth penetrating in the early 1990s. As ascertained in studies on
trafficking in Bulgaria,6 investment in common consumer goods was much less risky
than trading in drugs. The huge socialist era commodity deficit created business
opportunities securing between 1 and 2 million consumers per year and a nearly
50% profit from import of “white” and “black” household appliances, cigarettes,
alcohol, and other goods in high demand. In contrast, the drug market could never
have exceeded 5,000-6,000 people by the mid-1990s, even if the number of heroin
addicts had had a yearly growth of 50%. 
The survey makes it clear that within the span of a few months in 1990, most
opiate addicts in Sofia had switched to heroin due to the continuing strict control
over medical opiates and the comparatively easy access to heroin which, moreover,
has a much stronger effect. According to expert opinion, destroying the Iranian
channel at an early stage would not have checked the heroin epidemic, but would
probably have delayed it by a couple of years.
1.3. THE FIRST HEROIN OUTBREAK (1992-1994)
Despite growing usage rates, around 1992 heroin was available only at a limited
number of spots. The hottest sales spot in Sofia was the underground shopping area
of the National Palace of Culture. The above mentioned Iranian refugees moved
their business there, selling ever bigger amounts with diminishing caution. Between
1990 and 1991, heroin was circulated mostly among “old opiate addicts.” This
explains the small number of registered drug incidents. In 1990, a total of 183 cases
in which emergency medical assistance was sought were recorded, while in 1991 that
number was 195, i.e. up by only 6.6%.
However, in 1992 incidents with addicts grew by 31%, unleashing, in most
experts’ opinion, the heroin epidemic. There were several small-scale outbreaks in
various residential areas of the capital. Within three to four months in areas like Zona
B-5, Lyulin, and Mladost dozens of new addicts were hooked. 
Retail drug dealing was taken up by Bulgarian citizens who were already addicted
to heroin and had criminal records. Sales followed the pattern of old users, with
pushers allowing their acquaintances to sample heroin. Thus, those already addicted
became the first street-level dealers, spontaneously starting a pattern of diffusion. The
strategy of these opiate addicts was to use their circle of friends as 
5 The interviews revealed that the second sales site in front of the Rubin Bar was initially supplied by
Roma who stole heroin from an Albanian courier. 
6 See CSD Report: Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, 2002; Smuggling in Southeast
Europe, 2002; Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, 2000.
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sources of income to pay for their daily fix. The second level of the heroin market
remains to be revealed, i.e. who it was that supplied the retailers. Obviously, a small
portion of Bulgarian drug addicts had the resources or the contacts to access European
heroin channels. As mentioned above, back then international drug networks ignored
Bulgaria as a potential market.7 As noted in the interviews, street dealers bought
substances from foreigners. As with the Iranians, the drugs more than likely came from
foreign residents and transiting emigrants, and were meant for personal use. So, initially
it was the community of Middle Eastern citizens that delivered the heroin, which was
further circulated by Bulgarian street dealers. In 1992, however, deliveries became
more organized. The upsurge of “Arabic companies” saturated the market not only
with gray and black import consumer goods, but also with heroin.
It should be pointed out that until 1992 the number of drug addicts in the
countryside was extremely low. Until 1998 in cities with population over 100,000 like
Stara Zagora, Pleven, Yambol, and Dobrich, registered dependent users were no
more than 10-15 people in each, while in smaller towns drug addicts were
nonexistent, and people were aware of the issue only because it was brought up by
the national media.
Before 1995 the heroin available in Bulgaria was fairly strong and low-priced.
While experienced opiate addicts injected heroin, most of the novices started to mix
it with tobacco and smoke it—a very convenient method, requiring no preparation or
skill. This was rather misleading to a number of young people who would smoke a
joint with the false assumption that it was a special kind of grass. Another important
fact is that initially heroin was the only illicit drug in Bulgaria, while later, the use of
marijuana often preceded the heroin stage. The most widespread rationalization of
marijuana use in the period of 1992-1994 was that it was “a cross between cigarettes
and alcohol that makes a party swing,” and that it involved almost no risk. Yet
marijuana at that time, or rather the bulk of products dubbed marijuana, was rather
low in active ingredients. In other words, many young people who assumed they were
using marijuana were unaware of its actual effects. It might be speculated that such
fake marijuana, lacking any effect on the user, led many young people to believe that
opiates—and heroin in particular—were the only true drugs. Quality marijuana was
either imported or locally produced by a handful of devotees of the older generation
and was used by a small circle of connoisseurs, rarely reaching the market. 
The easy transition from legal drugs (cigarettes and alcohol)8 to marijuana and
then to heroin was also influenced by the inadequate messages of preventive
discourse that rendered marijuana an entry drug that inevitably led to heroin. A
heroin dependent woman eager to safeguard young people from replicating her own
mistakes commented: “It’s a fact that grass is the first step to harder drugs … and
these kids (learning about it) are thinking: ‘After I try this I should move to the next
one.’” This is how the transition to injecting heroin could appear to be the most
natural thing. In this way, an ever-increasing share of addicts had followed the course
of pot smoking to heroin smoking to heroin injections.
7 The hypothesis that these were drugs sold by couriers off their regular routes to Western Europe is
rather unsound. Such activities would not only be unprofitable for the couriers (often unaware of
what the transited commodity is), but would also be rather risky for them.
8 As evident from surveys (see Part 3), the level of teenage cigarette and alcohol use in Bulgaria is
exceptionally high when compared to both Western and Eastern Europe. 
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Medical statistics show that the
period between 1992 and 1994 was a
turning point (see Figure 1). In 1993,
people who sought help in relation to
drugs rose by 55%, in 1994 this figure
rose by 51%. 
Cases in Plovdiv first, and later in
Varna and Bourgas, followed Sofia. If at
the beginning heroin was bought from
“Arabs living in Sofia,” later on “Arab
sellers” settled in Varna and Plovdiv.
Police and special services data for the
period imply that Bulgarian organized
crime and gray economic groups were
not yet interested in the drug market.
They were engaged in expanding their
zone of influence for consumer goods
like petrol, alcohol, and cigarettes. The
embargo regime over Yugoslavia
provided even greater prospects for that. 
Between 1992 and 1994, rival security firms9 occasionally became involved in drug
distribution. There were few “security actions” taken by security guards upon drug
selling venues or against clients. In 1994, when takeovers and mergers between
security firms started to make some of them national chains, e.g. VIS-1 and Club 777,
drug trade was still considered an “unwanted activity” and drug sellers were viewed
as marginal.
In late 1993, the first heroin sellers in Bulgaria, the Iranians from the Hemus Hotel,
were shot dead by the police.10 Despite conflicting evidence, this case provoked the
assumption among drug circles that policemen should be bribed in order to tolerate
drug selling activities. In 1993 the Central Service for Combating Organized Crime
(CSCOC) made its first seizure of a sizeable amount of heroin (2 kilograms), notably
owned by a Bulgarian citizen. The operation was conducted two years after the 
9 “Security firms” in Bulgaria are a phenomenon yet to be explored, and could be defined as one of
the sources of organized crime in the country. The phenomenon of forcing companies and
individuals to pay for security services evolved in a number of SEE countries after 1990.  A feature
that distinguishes Bulgaria from the other countries is that the security companies were formed by
former sportsmen. Such organizations were based on friendly circles established as early as
secondary sports schools, and were based upon the charisma of their leaders. Networks of friends
from sports like wrestling and boxing became the core of security companies and were dubbed
“wrestlers,” which turned into a common word for using violence.  Soon, policemen and criminals
joined the companies. Gradually, such wrestler firms grew into large chains controlling dozens of
cities throughout the country and performing a growing number of “black favors,” from extortion of
debts to vandalizing the property of rivals.  
10 For more information on the assassinations that stared on 6.12.1993 and finished on 21.12.1993, see
the issues of the daily Standard between 7.12.1993 and 30.01.1994.
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Number
Figure 1. Number of drug users that
sought treatment (1990-1999)
Source: Annual Report of National Drugs Council, 2001
establishment of the Drug Department at CSCOC. The inadequacy of institutions at
the time is apparent from the fact that three years after the ingress of heroin, they
were still not showing any commitment to what was happening in the streets. 
1.4. THE END OF THE FIRST HEROIN WAVE (1995-1997)
Between 1995 and 1997, the growth rate of the number of drug-users seeking
specialized help for drug problems dropped (see Figure 1). In 1995 the increase was
24.6%, down from a 51% increase in 1994. In 1996 the increase was as low as 5.4%. 
A series of events in the gray and black economy at this time most certainly
affected the Bulgarian drug market. In late 1994, after the establishment of a licensing
regime for security firms by Reneta Indzhova’s provisional government, the larger of
these quasi-criminal structures went on building networks throughout Bulgaria,
responding to the new legal requirements. Security companies that were refused
licenses evolved into, and registered as, insurance companies. These became
notorious for the use of violence in their activities. It was then that the biggest criminal
insurance companies VIS (Vassil Ilyev Security, later to become VIS-2) and SIC
(Security and Insurance Company) came to light.11
Taking control of residential areas, these major crime enterprises started to inhibit
and even pursue street dealers. It is arguable whether this was a purposeful policy or
some kind of image improvement campaign, but the protection of children from
street crime and drugs was certainly consistent with the idea of guaranteeing the
security of the population.12 The first police hunts for drug dealers in Sofia date back
from early 1995. Experts, however, claim that the reduction of supply was due to the
jettisoning of Arab companies. Hundreds of small and medium companies from the
Middle East were intimidated by crime groups and the police.13 They were driven
out of the market niches that they had occupied since 1990-1992. Although these
efforts aimed mainly at firmly establishing criminal players in the consumer goods
sphere, they had a strong impact on drug channels, too. The deteriorating purity of
street heroin at that time proves this hypothesis. 
While crime enterprises were alleged opponents of heroin dispersion, there is
evidence of initial contacts between them and worldwide drug networks at that
time. The end of the embargo over Yugoslavia in 1995 reopened the former heroin
trail through Bulgaria to Western Europe. At about the same time, Kosovo “liberation
armies” started funding themselves largely through the trafficking of heroin to 
11 This report does not aspire to discuss the development of criminal insurance companies in Bulgaria.
Nonetheless, a synopsis of their activities is necessary for the purpose of tracking drug diffusion and
use.
12 The new insurance companies had undertaken campaigns aimed to prove that they were much more
effective than their traditional counterparts. The media published articles focusing on cases of
vehicles and stores insured by them that very seldom would become objects of violent acts, arguing
that any stolen property was found in most cases, while damages would be paid at a very short
notice. In addition, there were claims that such companies protected the residential areas in a way
regular police forces could not.
13 Following the security companies licensing campaign, the newly emerging insurance companies
attempted to collaborate closely with the police.   
The Drug Market in Bulgaria 13
Western Europe, and considerable loads of it passed through Bulgaria. In 1996, a
shipment of 600 kilograms cocaine was seized at the Varna port.14 No large shipments
of cocaine followed it (until the summer of 2003) which, in addition to the
information gathered by the police after a series of killings in the period 1999-2001
(See Part 2), testifies that international channel logistics15 were backed by Bulgarian
crime enterprises.16 
1.5. CLOSING DOWN INSURANCE COMPANIES AND THE ENCROACHMENT OF
ORGANIZED CRIME OVER DRUG DEALERSHIP (1997 – 2001)
The political turmoil of March 1997, and the introduction of the currency board
with its respective financial constraints (June 1997), caused profound transformations
in the criminal and quasi-criminal structures as well. The state’s pressure over the
most conspicuous of the crime enterprises—in the insurance business such as SIC,
VIS-2, Corona Ins., Zora Ins., Apolo&BalkanCo., and Spartak led to a partial
dissolution of their structures. In 1998 these companies were removed from the
insurance market by law, which resulted in the loss of their main source of income—
the insurance of vehicles and shops.17 Thus, their local branches started looking for
new sources of revenue. According to special services sources, former insurers began
to participate in drug transit, import, and distribution for the first time in 1997. 
Between 1997 and 2001, several distinctly novel patterns of drug distribution and
use emerged. Bulgarian criminal groups were already fully involved in heroin
distribution and transit (as well as in cocaine deals, although not as fully).18
Consumption of heroin rose and soft drugs use soared, while synthetic drugs demand
reemerged. Though these trends might seem to interlock, their logic and pace are
rather singular. These separate trends are reviewed below.
14 A group of dock workers that decided to break open a container labeled “Jeans,” discovered an
unidentified powder inside. They panicked and informed customs officials of their find. 
15 Similar cases were simultaneously recorded in Croatia and Bosnia (see Smuggling in Southeast Europe,
2002).  Bulgarian special services and customs sources have confirmed the creation of the so called
Spanish channel (from Latin America, through the Balkans to Spain), involving crime organizations
from at least three Balkan states—Bulgaria, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 The pattern that was most probably followed was that of commodity smuggling, in which no
accidents are allowed to happen. The commodity is strictly watched from warehouses, through
transportation, to border crossing. Each shipment is guarded by border and traffic police officers as
well, and even by the regional services for combating organized crime.
17 Opinions about the extent to which former criminal insurance companies have remained key players
in the insurance market vary. Certain facts imply that they have managed to reform and adapt to the
new conditions, yet on the whole, they have lost their influence on a national level and thus, most of
their sources of funding.
18 Organized crime’s involvement in drug diffusion at that time can be deducted from the rising number
of Bulgarian nationals detained for drug trafficking, as well as by the interviews with experts at the
Customs Agency and NSCOC. Other sources are the interviews with long-term drug users and drug
prevention and treatment agencies. 
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Ä. The Involvement of Organized Crime in Heroin Transit Channels and Their Capture of Domestic Markets 
If there were relatively few drug users and addicts when democratic changes
began, by the end of the 1990s the domestic drug market had expanded enough to
catch the attention of local criminal structures. From 1990 on, the heroin market
has been increasing by 25% per year.19 Insurance companies’ loss of secure revenues
naturally led to crime groups overtaking drug import and distribution. The ousting of
Middle East drug suppliers (or their integration in local crime groups) started in 1998.
Domestic supply within the bigger cities (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Bourgas, and Rousse)
was also redistributed. During this period, heroin was sold by small groups of 5 to 10
people. The customary structure was a boss who oversaw a couple of street dealers.
The supply usually came from Turkey. The “hostile takeover” of drug dealership had
started as early as 1996, initiated by the “Orbita Hotel guys” (SIC), and followed by
Korona Ins. By late 1998, the process was accomplished. The recruitment scheme
worked as follows: after identifying the network owners (usually covering 1 or 2 areas
of the town), they were given the choice of entering a partnership or abandoning
their market. The forms of partnership offered were either ‡) protection, for a fixed
weekly or monthly fee; b) the purchase of substances exclusively from the crime
structures; or c) payment for settlement of specific problems, such as debt collection
or complications with the police. 
These offers were made in one of several ways: ‡) through the demonstration of
force involving two, three or more tinted glass cars; b) through threatening or
battering a couple of dealers and fining them; c) through meetings (talks over a drink
which sometimes could last for several days); d) a mixture of the above, which was
most commonly the case.
When intimidation of independent drug dealers became a regular practice, they
started seeking shelter with the larger organizations. Street dealers found their
superiors, or were pushed out by those remnants of the former large insurance
companies that had managed to prevail over an area. The establishment of heroin
networks in mid-size cities like Pleven, Sliven, Stara Zagora, Yambol, Dobrich,
Haskovo, etc. took no longer than a year. And although the number of potential users
there was low, 2,000-3,000 heroin users were added to the general national count
within a couple of years. Because of such developments, experts speak of a “second
outburst of the heroin epidemic.”
19 This rate is based on statistics for the annual increase of registered dependent drug users who have
sought help.
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Apart from the transformations of the
domestic market, certain changes in
drug transit through the country are
noteworthy. Prior to 1997, Bulgarian
criminal structures took part in cross-
border drug trade networks only
incidentally. The fall of the insurance
businesses, however, incited brisk
contacts with world-scale drug
organizations. In that period, Western
anti-drug agencies detected encounters
between Bulgarians and representatives
of well-known Turkish, Albanian,
Caucasian, Italian, and Western
European drug organizations. Initially,
the local structures of the former
insurance business participated in
transfer operations.20 The first large-scale
services they offered to international
drug organizations were probably the
escorting of couriers through Bulgaria.21
Another type of service delivered by
former insurers at that time was the
provision of no-contact channels—
shipped boxes or containers were
supervised and guarded in Bulgarian
warehouses and duty free zones, often
without any information about the kind
of goods being shipped. Bulgarian crime
groups that acted as a link in these
channels were rather primitive,
consisting of no more than 10-12 players
and a boss. The different groups had no
coordination between themselves. Their
links swayed between sporadic
collaboration and frequent periods of
hostility. 
20 Experts in combating organized crime maintain that although the largest insurance companies,  SIC
and VIS, were represented throughout the country, most of their local branches acted as
independent entities rather than as lower ranking units. 
21 Unfortunately, Bulgarian security services have rather meager concrete information at their disposal
about the what and when of these events. The information available concerns mainly reception and
escort of Albanian and Turkish mules.
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through Southeast Europe
Source: Smuggling in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2002
Bulgaria is the crossroad of three main drug smuggling routes through the
Balkans branch:
• The bulk of Asian heroin traveled from Bulgaria through the former
Yugoslavia prior to 1991. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this route
was temporarily cut off and two alternative routes took over. After 1995, this
“classic” route was again revived.
• The northern route leads through Romania, and from there either through
Hungary to the Czech Republic and Slovakia (and from there to the EU), or
through the Ukraine to Poland (and from there to the EU).
• The southern route leads form Bulgaria through Macedonia and Kosovo to
Albania.
One of the consequences of the war in the former Yugoslavia is that now the
illegal drug trade encompasses all of the countries in that region.
In 1998, the importance of Bulgarian organizations outgrew courier and guarding
tasks to include greater responsibilities, like securing hiding places and carrying out
the actual shipment. Possibly at that time, warehouses for parceling out big shipments
were set up. The actual cause of the increased significance of Bulgarian channels is
unknown. It could have been the ever larger output from Afghanistan, the blows
administered to traditional channels from Turkey to Italy, or the war effort in Kosovo.
In any case, the only available data of captures made within the country are for
the years prior to 1998. 
Preparation for the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the war effort itself in 1998-
1999, obstructed the old heroin route through the Balkans; thus, newly established
contacts and emerging channels had to be suspended for a year. These outer
limitations, however, enabled a mapping out of domestic areas of control. Criminal
networks affirmed their zones of influence precisely at that time. In bigger cities,
such zones were controlled by two or three groups while smaller towns were
monopolized by local structures. Unfortunately, no reliable data for the period of
1999-2000 is available from police or other relevant agencies. Meanwhile, however,
specialized drug combating units were formed in Sofia and Varna—the two most
challenging drug-related sites. 
In late 1999 and early 2000, the external situation likewise changed. With Kosovo
under international administration, Albanian extremism in Macedonia on the rise,
and overproduction of drugs in Afghanistan (which brought about a slump in heroin
prices in Turkey) supposedly record amounts of heroin were trafficked through
Bulgaria. The 1,860 kilograms of heroin captured at the Bulgarian borders in 2000 is
convincing evidence to this fact, as is the record domestic shipment of 129 kilograms.
Regarding heroin use, the year 2000 was a peak year according to a variety of data
and expert assessments (see Part 2). Since the Turkish and Albanian mafia preferred
to pay in kind, Bulgarian traffickers had to make their profit through the selling a
certain amount of drugs on the domestic market. In keeping with this pattern, an
agent making a successful shipment would keep between 1/10 and 1/20 of it. After a
series of significant border captures in the first half of 2000, upcountry territory was
increasingly used to store and reload drugs coming from Turkey. The first disclosure
of a warehouse for drug storage by NSCOC was made in September 2000, in the
village of Garvanovo, in the Haskovo district.
Supply and distribution on a national scale was still the domain of the former
structures, like SIC, VIS, and some smaller insurance companies that would not admit
outsiders. The growing heroin traffic within the country led to a new, violence-laden
redistribution of markets in 2000. A total of seven bombings were carried out in Varna
in an attempt to threaten or murder drug dealers, while in Bourgas two dealers were
assassinated. Heroin was obviously the backbone of new crime enterprises, yet
soft and synthetic drugs had started to tempt organized crime as well.
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B. The Surge of Soft Drug Use
The fast onslaught of heroin may be contrasted to the rather low pitch of soft drug
use after the 1990 reforms. A certain swell did occur yet this happened no earlier than
the mid-1990s. There are several factors defining soft drug use as a whole:
Bulgaria’s climate is favorable for the growing of marijuana in most parts of the
country, Southern Bulgaria being the most suitable.22 The plant quickly became a
profitable means to make a living for many rural inhabitants.
Marijuana users tend to grow a few plants per year, too, to satisfy their personal needs.
Our long-use interviewees stated that in recent years fairly good seeds were easy to find.
Marijuana use escalated not only in schools, but all over the country. Certain
groups of adults started to try the drug (rightfully considered much less harmful than
the feared heroin). 
In the period 1998-1999, two hostile marijuana markets emerged in Bulgaria. The
bigger proportion of marijuana was distributed by pushers who were in direct contact
with producers and sold the drug to friends at low prices for insignificant profits—a
feature typical of the early stages of marijuana market growth in developed countries.
Experts claim that as few as 10% of users consume 90% of all marijuana, and that
regular users are accustomed to buying particular amounts from petty dealers.
A certain perctentage of marijuana output and circulation was increasingly run by
organized criminal groups. As underlined above, up to the crucial 1997, the
domestic market as a whole—let alone the highly decentralized trade in soft drugs—
was outside the province of crime enterprises. 
In the late 1990s, however, a school market evolved in the larger cities. This
market did not emerge out of the blue, but was paved by individual entrepreneurs
who, even in the early 1990s, provided the link between suppliers of the cheap
agricultural product and the respective demand for it. The distribution scheme had
only to be decked out in a marketable form, i.e. the ready-made joint. Thus, an
alternative to alcohol and cigarettes was offered—a cheap ready-made drug that
spares the young, inexperienced users the technologically complex drug production
process. As with heroin, this market was penetrated by organized crime groups as
soon as it was sufficiently big and developed. Police sources reveal that during this
period “easy riders” were discarded after targeting the respective markets/schools,
and were replaced by young people involved with local gangs. Supply was no longer
dependent on incidental individual entrepreneurs. Well structured supply channels
appeared instead, and potential clients were waylaid at every corner—at the
schoolyard during breaks, between classes, at disco clubs, and at parties. Hence,
within the following two years, a consumption boom developed among high school
students in several of the biggest cities, as well as in most former district centers.
Some experts consider that if it wasn’t for the low quality of joints and the absence
of a pot smoking tradition Bulgaria would probably rank first in pot use in the same
way it has achieved the top tobacco-use rates. 
22 It is believed that even in the 1980s certain amounts were cultivated in the Petrich area especially for
export to Greece.
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At the end of this period, joint quality was still dropping, while many pushers who
hadn’t dealt in hard drugs as a matter of principle, were literally forced to sell heroin.
On the other hand, the stagnation of the heroin market forced certain dealers to
diversify by selling marijuana (e.g., some pushers in the Sofia residential area
Druzhba). This implies that one of the goals of organized crime was merging the
marijuana market, and targeting teenagers with heroin. This is, indeed, a matter of
concern.
There was one more domain quickly taken over by organized crime, namely the
export of soft drugs. The mid-1990s marked the beginning of organized marijuana
export channels to Greece. Earlier, it had been conducted by a small number of
individuals from Southwest Bulgaria, whose success tempted local criminal structures
to take hold of all Greece-bound export. Since the price of pot in Greece is four times
higher, Bulgarian marijuana users speculate that all quality marijuana is exported,
while only leftover “trash” is offered to domestic consumers. Marijuana cultivation,
cropping, transportation, and the hire of Greek dealers are low-risk endeavors.
Certain sources hint that similar patterns are starting to be employed for Central
Europe as well. 
C. The Penetration of Synthetic Drugs 
The use of synthetic drugs, mainly amphetamines, became widespread in the late
1990s, although there was evidence for their appearance as early as 1991-1992, in
discos, bars, clubs, and other youth hangouts. Amphetamines have a long-standing
history in this country due to the fact that Bulgaria was a major exporter—chiefly
to Arab countries—in the 1970s. In the wake of Bulgaria’s ratification of a number
of international arrangements that classified amphetamines as psychoactive
substances, amphetimines remained in Bulgaria undestroyed. This output was later
distributed along illicit channels within the country. That the stored quantities
were huge is clear from their continuing availability even now. The Czech Republic,
for instance, is a contrasting example, with only the occasional use of amphetamines
recorded up to 1991-1992, due to the lack of such tradition (see above). 
Apart from the amphetamines left in storage, their production shrank, but did not
cease altogether despite international commitments. Documents published after the
democratic reforms testify to a continuing export of the drug Captagon23 to the
Middle East until late 1989. As for the post-1990 period, there is unofficial
information about informal state channels for Middle East bound amphetamines,
later privatized by state security officers, foreign sales representatives, and
chemists who had sustained them.24 As with the importing of heroin, amphetamine
exports were assisted by Middle Eastern citizens. As stocks gradually exhausted, the
need for more production emerged. But because of increased risk after the Captagon
disclosures,25 professionals who knew the production technology, assisted by former 
23 A report by the Government of Dimitar Popov published in 1991 testifies to its continuing export in
the form of medicaments.
24 According to Bulgarian special services, even in the early 1990s, these preserved amphetamines were
exported through Turkey to various Middle East countries by exploiting previous contacts with the
Arab world.
25 Bulgarian pharmaceutical companies were privatized in the late 1990s.
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state producers, created small illegal workshops (about 20-30 such shops were set up
within a couple of years according to some indirect assessments). 
Synthetic drug production in the 1990s could only be compared to the situation
in Poland. Polish output had become a big hit in Western Europe. Likewise, Bulgaria
had a large number of qualified and experienced chemists capable of developing
simple and inexpensive technological solutions. This could happen due to existing
markets in which the Bulgarian product was well-known and accessible through
established delivery channels. The enterprise involved only minimum risk since
institutions with anti-drug functions had little experience. Because the technological
chain of production was split, all disclosures of illegal workshops—and the
subproducts found there—could not, in fact, be declared illegal. 
Polish synthetic drugs are known to be of higher quality, and are therefore
successfully marketed in EU countries, while Bulgarian ones are targeted at Middle
East markets where they sell at lower prices. 
The expansion of amphetamine export was paralleled by enlargement of the
domestic market. However, no consistent picture of the situation at that time can be
described due to inconsistent information. Up to 1997-1998 amphetamines, too,
were chiefly sold by individuals and, as with heroin and soft drugs, the entry of former
insurance companies into the business instituted a more purposeful marketing
course. 
It is a coincidence that crime groups which made sizeable profits from the
embargo over Yugoslavia—from contraband goods to “insurance” endeavors—
sought to launder their money by investing in discotheques, night clubs, and
other entertainment venues for young people. It was in these venues that the
well-functioning network of amphetamine sales was developed.26 Former
insurance companies took hold of the elite places, thus securing a good share of their
income from sales of synthetic drugs. Mass marketing was achieved through using the
brand name Ecstasy, the highly reputed Western drug, yet what was sold under this
label in Bulgaria were amphetamines. Thus, believing they were using Ecstasy, most
young Bulgarians were served a locally produced con.
A fact worth mentioning is the success of the Bulgarian special services in
discovering several small synthetic drugs laboratories, loaded with dozens of
kilograms of drugs. The most substantial capture of Bulgarian output so far was made
in late 1997, when 330 kilograms of amphetamine base powder and 666 kilograms of
Benzylmethylketon (BMK) were seized in the Opitsvet laboratory.
26 The surge of amphetamine use was not provoked solely by crime enterprises. Bulgaria could not have
resisted the growing popularity of synthetic drugs on a world scale. This class of drugs was inseparable
from a particular type of imported music, clothes, and leisure activities that were emulated in
Bulgaria.
20 CSD Reports 12
2. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION IN 
BULGARIA
The first part outlined the development of the Bulgarian drug market, from its
genesis circa 1990, through its maturity at the end of the 1990s. This section will
examine the current situation of the drug market, focusing on the size and structure
of demand. Four major groups of drug users have been identified (for a more detailed
discussion see Part 3), constituting three main markets: heroin; “soft” and synthetic
drugs; and the marginal market of cocaine, LSD, and other less frequently used
psychoactive substances. These markets are practically independent of each other
and are largely tinted by regional and local peculiarities.27
2.1. THE HEROIN MARKET 
Among the various parts of the Bulgarian drug market, the heroin market is by far
the most significant, defining all other sectors of the drug market. In light of the fact
that after 1998 drug-related crime grew to be the backbone of organized crime,
before examining the soft and synthetic drug markets, we will analyze the
organization of the heroin market.
The analysis of drug distribution in Bulgaria reveals no single coherent domestic
drug-market. Rather, the largest cities—Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, and Bourgas—operate
as independent, local markets. Each of them is dominated and shared by three to
four big criminal organizations. Based on the controversial accounts of policemen,
drug-dealers, and drug-users, a certain general model of the organizational structure
of these big drug markets can be outlined. Sofia, estimated to constitute about half of
the country’s drug market, has a five-tiered hierarchy, while in cities like Varna,
Bourgas, and Plovdiv, the drug distribution has four levels. The smaller towns typically
are served by the local networks operating in the major Bulgarian cities. The size of
each town or village predetermines its place in the hierarchy. For instance, dealers in
small towns like Radomir are in subordination to a middle level drug-boss in Sofia.
Larger towns like Rousse, Stara Zagora, Pleven, Sliven, Vratza, Yambol, Pernik and
others, have their drug-bosses subordinated to bosses at the top of the national
hierarchy (i.e., the bosses of the three or four dominating drug organizations). 
These four and five-tier hierarchies come extremely close in functional terms to
the classical six-tier structure of distribution in the New York heroin market proposed
by Preble and Casey in 1969.28
27 Each of Bulgaria’s large cities has its own specifics.
28 Edward A. Preble and John J. Casey, Jr., “Taking Care of Business-The Heroin User’s Life on the
Street,” International Journal of the Addictions, 4 (March 1969)
The typical drug organization is governed by two operational principles: hierarchy
(see Figure 3) and sectorization (see Figure 5). Our analysis is based on the most
developed market, Sofia. At the same time, wherever possible, comparisons are
made with other, less developed drug networks in the country. 
The first tier, “heroin addicts”, is our
starting point in the description of drug
distribution in Sofia. Many international
studies prove that the transition from an
end-user and a seller of heroin is a
natural process. Surveys in Bulgaria
confirm this model, too. Interviews with
long-term addicts prove that, in over
50% of the cases, they have traded as
street dealers at some point in their
history. Thus, the first tier is the major
source for recruitment of street dealers.
When there is a “job opening” due to
arrests or some other reason, it gets filled
within hours by drug addicts who
choose to avoid the trouble of searching
and paying for their daily doses. 
Second tier, “street dealers”29. We
can calculate the number of street
dealers by extrapolating from the
estimated number of 15,000 to 25,000
drug users in the country (see for more
detail Part 3). According to recent
studies, in Sofia and other large cities, a
dealer supplies an average of 25-30
users. Thus, the total number of retail
sellers of heroin is approximately 600-
800, out of which 300-400 operate in Sofia. The number of customers served by each
dealer may vary from five or six to 50 or so, depending on the area, the quality of the
drug offered, the organization of supply, etc. There are dealers who earn their living
from no more than ten customers, but they are either “beginners,” (to whom
customers are initially sent, and who are expected to broaden their base), “retiring”
dealers (withdrawing from the market), or ones servicing only the more important,
well-off clients. 
The figure of the dealer resembles that of the “trade agent”—good ones look for
better places to sell and can change their bosses (the networks owners). Experienced
dealers have usually worked for five or six bosses. The old type of dealer was typically
a drug-abuser, and his main motive to be on the street was to provide for his personal
consumption needs. As a result, at the lowest level, the principle underlying and 
29 “Dealers” is the definition for anyone selling to end users (drug-users). Apart from those selling in the
streets, there is a relatively small number of dealers selling from their homes,or regularly offering
drugs in their stores/cafes/recreational establishments.
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Source: CSD Estimation
supporting the whole organization of drug-distribution is that of “dilution”30 of the
substance. In order to have enough for himself, the street dealer dilutes the substance
as much as possible. This mechanism is at work on all levels. Thus, for instance, if on
the fourth level “the boss” (the owner) of the network receives from the big boss one
kilogram of heroin at a certain price, or is allowed to import three kilograms, he
profits not only from “passing” the heroin down to the lower level at a higher price,
but also from doubling, or tripling its quantity through dilution before passing it
down. On the third level, the participants’ income again depends upon increasing
the quantity via dilution, and profit results from the difference in the quantities
purchased and those sold. On the second level, the street dealer continues to dilute
the substance, but at the same time he must act with care, as he faces two threats:
The fourst, is to “lose” customers who are dissatisfied with the poor quality of the
substance. If the dealer has diluted the substance too much, the drug-addict will
immediately look to find “a new seller with better stuff.” Often within the same area,
a full turnover takes place within a month, with drug-addicts switching between two
and three sellers, and then going back to the first. The second threat is related to the
control exercised by the drug networks. In “better areas,” the area “supervisor” may
impose fines for poor quality. To control the quality, some drug-addicts may be asked
to assess the substance in supply. Sometimes control is exercised simply for the sake
of collecting the fine, as an additional income for the local supervisors. Apart from
testing the quality of the heroin, dealers are controlled through the monitoring of
their cell phone, which comes with a pre-paid card. 
After 2001, both the distribution pattern and the profile of the dealer changed
significantly. While the old type of dealer typically sold from home, or at public
places (squares, parks, recreational establishments, etc.) where drug-addicts got
together, after the advance of mobile phones, and especially with the introduction of
pre-paid cards, over 95% of the sales were carried out “over the phone.”31 Pre-paid
cards secure anonymity for the dealer, and the phone number can be changed easily.
Usually the dealer establishes different meeting places out of the sight of the police.
There are various techniques for safely exchanging the heroin doses. For instance, the
dealer has the “stuff” in hand and, shaking hands, takes a banknote in exchange for
the substance. Since a dealer is most vulnerable if caught with a number of doses, he
tries to have as little substance on him as possible, keeping the rest in safe places.
Needed stock is packaged in a special way so that it can easily be disposed of. A
popular approach is to put the “stuff” in the mouth, each dose wrapped as a plastic
capsule. If a bust takes place, the doses are swallowed and, on release from
detention,32 the dealer waits for the capsules to exit the body naturally. 
30 Known variants to dilute vary. From rough imitations like chalk, powder sugar, grind brick, to
medicines to boost action (codeine, glutetamide, etc.) There are even substitute products, in dealers’
use, the most popular of which is the so-called “Dutch mix”.  
31 Dealers were selling “over the phone” as early as the mid 1990s, but this practice never became
widespread due to the under-developed market, low police activity in public places, and the
possibility to track the owner of the phone.
32 As per Penal Procedure Code, if charges are not pressed up to 24 hours, or 72 hours (when the person
has been detained for harsh crime), the detainee is released. 
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Hand-to-hand exchange is considered unsafe, and attempts are made to come up
with more secure techniques, like working in micro-teams of two and three players.
Usually each player is assigned a specific role: one arranges the sale on the phone,
another takes the money, and a third person places the stuff at a pre-set safe location.
Another precaution is the involvement of under-aged dealers, who are less
vulnerable to criminal prosecution and are easier to bail out by lawyers. A recent
development is that network owners recruit “clean dealers” (non-abusers of drugs)
and replace them if they “get hooked.” This practice succeeds in confusing the
police, and a certain number of dealers remain out of their sight. 
The reality of the drug-trade market, however, proves that despite the efforts of
drug bosses the networks continue to operate in their old routine. Dealers are still
predominantly drug-users, and the micro-teams fall apart within weeks. Due to the
psychological instability of drug-addict dealers, “security rules” are not followed
consistently, and doses are exchanged in the old way. In many areas of Sofia,
although the sales take place over the phone, drug-addicts sustain direct contact with
their dealers at certain hangouts. Often, dealers are not concerned with safety
because they have “bought” their security from district police officers. It is a public
secret that dealers know in advance about police busts. To divert suspicion that
police are covering for them, less fitting or random dealers are sacrificed.
Pertinent to the operation of the system is the question of how much a street
dealer earns. As reported by the dealers themselves, their earnings in 2003 range from
50 to 150 BGN per day (the equivalent of US$30-$90). From this amount, however,
they have to pay for their own heroin doses. If many of their customers are “short,”33
the dealers claim, “you go down to 50 BGN, and after paying for your doses you are
left with nothing.” Data from different sources suggest that the amount of 150 BGN
per day, or 4500 BGN per month, is within reach of very few of the dealers (old sellers
with special status). Interviews with Sofia dealers support the conclusion that the
average daily amount is between 70 and 80 BGN, while the monthly income rarely
exceeds 1500 BGN, due to many “bad days.” For the sake of comparison, in the mid
1990s the average income of a dealer working at a good place was above $200 a day,
but then, too, there were places where the daily earnings were as low as $15. 
The dealers’ identity varies wildly across cities. For instance, in Plovdiv most of the
dealers are ethnic Roma taxi drivers, in Bourgas the sellers are ordinary looking
youngsters, distinguishable by their tattoos only—each drug-boss marks his people in
this way. Apart from showing they belong to a dealers’ network, the tattoos also point
to the dealer’s rank in the hierarchy. They most often represent mythical creatures
and Eastern plants. Thus the dealers mark their territories, and the clients know that
they are dealing with the right person.
Passing on to the higher tiers in the hierarchy, it must be noted that there are no
clear-cut demarcation lines between the levels. Chaos, continuous fluctuation, and
intricate entourage networks make any categorization provisional. Along these lines,
the tier of the “street dealers” stands out as the most clearly defined compared to
higher levels. 
33 This is the slang for drug users who instead of the average 6 BGN per dose in Sofia (2003) continue
paying the old price of 5 BGN. Elsewhere across the country a dose keeps selling for 5 BGN, in Varna
reportedly going down to 3 BGN.
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The third tier in the Sofia market does not have a clearly defined function, as has
already been emphasized, probably due to poor organization and a lack of discipline
within the drug-networks. One would expect that those who supply the substances
to the dealers, and those who collect the cash from the sales, would fall into this tier.
The obscure role of the third tier players is best illustrated by the fact that we failed
to find an accepted street jargon name for them. Labels vary from “base” to “dealer”
(the latter being the name for dealers proper as well). Therefore, there is a possible
overlap between the roles of the street dealer and of the “supplier.” According to
former third level players, they were better paid than the dealers and their functions
also included collecting money and calling the bosses if problems occurred with
some of the dealers. Based on evidence of how dealers pay their drug network
“bosses” and the police, it can be assumed that the third tier collects the dues as an
intermediary. The amount received by a “supplier” is in proportion to the sales made
by the dealers who are supplied by him. The scheme works out in the following way:
a “dealer” orders the needed quantity and buys by the gram. The most frequently
ordered quantities are 5 or 10 grams. In Sofia during the summer of 2003, one
“street” gram cost about 40 BGN (20 EUR), that is the retail dealer must pay 200 BGN,
or 400 BGN respectively. The official profit made by the “supplier” is 10% on the
price paid by the dealers, but according to the “principle of dilution” instead of
5 grams the dealer receives only 4 grams of substance, thus leaving one gram, or 40
BGN, for the supplier. With an average of three to six dealers buying from the same
supplier a total of 15–30 grams daily, the supplier’s earnings can reach 200–300 BGN
per day. Often the figure of the “supplier-dealer”—who can sell while having dealers
to work under him, or is ready to take additional risk—comes into play. Tentatively
it can be said that supplying the dealers is the first step up the drug-hierarchy.
Whether at this level the supplier would be assigned “managerial” functions, or
would just be a “depot,” depends upon his performance and qualities.
With the appearance of mobile phone dealers, a new type of organization
emerges where the supplier acts as a coordinator and manager of the dealers.
Customers call him directly on his phone, and he delegates which of the dealers will
supply the substance. A variety here is the “mobile supplier”—typical examples are
the taxi drivers in Plovdiv.34
The “supplier” tier is sometimes “skipped” by the network executives. The option
to hire an outsider to deliver substances for a substantially smaller commission than
a regular supplier is often a tempting option. There is evidence that shops, news
stands, cafes, and other commercial outlets working long hours have been used for
distribution. The daily amount paid to these sellers is between 10 and 20 BGN.
Generally speaking, though, this model dates back to the mid-90s, and is currently
considered unreliable. There are also networks, especially outside of Sofia, where
someone from the boss’s close entourage (usually the supervisor) supplies substances
to the dealers. 
Tracking the interaction between the second and third levels shows that from a
regular “six” (a dose costing 6 BGN) 45% remain with the dealer and some 20%, with
the supplier (see Figure 4). As already pointed out, “customer pressure” generates harsh
competition among the dealers. In the past two years, as a result of the extremely low  
34 The special role in organized crime played by taxi drivers and some taxi companies, not just in
Plovdiv, but across the country, is worthy of a separate survey.  
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quality of street heroin, dealers operate in constant conflict. A dealer may lose
customers over greater “dilution” on the part of the supplier and, hence, look for a
replacement. If that is the case, the area “boss” is the one to take measures.
Substances can only be obtained from a replacement supplier when the regular one
has fallen out of stock, and only then within the same “firm” (i.e. from suppliers
reporting to the area boss). In the case of a dealer obtaining substances from a source
outside the area (see below for area distributions), he is performing “shano” and
liable to serious punishment. 
This term has been introduced as a name for those working outside of the
networks: the so-called shano is a “free player,” who typically disregards domestic
drug organizations and uses uncontrolled channels for drug supplies. At present,
Arabs are prevalent among this category, as are residents of neighboring Balkan
countries (who are importing for their own use). They buy some 100-200 grams of the
substance, which is considerably cleaner than what is sold on the streets. The shano
works on his own behalf, and is a lucrative target for hit squads. Usually his property
is seized by the members of the hit squad. Elimination takes place through a
devastating fine, and through beating or even crippling in more stubborn cases. 
A special type of network participant
on the third level should be pointed
out—the figure of the “mule” (this term
is used by analogy with drug-trafficking,
without having an exact counterpart in
the domestic market in Bulgaria). The
function of the mule is to secure
substances for the supplier. Various
schemes are applied. For instance, the
mule brings stuff to the street, or gives an
“address” to the supplier to get it.
Usually, very “reliable” people, with
long crime records, are employed as
mules. To minimize the risk, taxi drivers,
drivers supplying commercial outlets,
and even policemen are employed (as
was the case in the town of Sliven).35
When arrested, such people have been
found to carry between 100 and 200
grams of heroin. 
Then there are the so-called
“warehouses,” where all substances for
the month are kept. It is known that in
the capital city there are two or three
large storage locations. The bust of a
“large warehouse” in Sofia in August
2002 found some 5 kilograms of
heroin.
35 See “Domestic news” - BTA 25.09.2002 and daily newspaper “Sega” 03.09.2003.
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Figure 4. The Heroin “Retail market”
Source: CSD Estimation
Interviews cast light on the fact that dealers do not communicate directly with
their bosses. Usually, the dealer knows the “area boss” personally, and yet, he only
has contact with his deputies. Most probably, these surrogate bosses also perform the
role of suppliers whenever necessary. Hence, these “deputies” should also be
classified as belonging to the third tier. According to our interviewees, the bosses “do
not lay hands on” the stuff, yet exercise consistent ‘operational’ control over the
network through their deputies. As reported by former and present dealers, meetings
between big bosses and the second tier take place occasionally, or when there is a
crisis in the system. 
The fourth tier, “area bosses,” does not have a clearly defined role and identity,
similar to the third tier. The controversial relationships among area bosses in Sofia
demonstrate that there is no established organizational pyramid. Often a network has
a couple of bosses “sharing power,” with no clear-cut subordination among them. 
The current structure of the fourth tier in Sofia, as of 2002-2003, is the result of
continuous clashes and agreements between separate groups. The final redistribution
of power occurred after the assassinations of Poli Pantev36 in the spring of 2001 and
Lyonya Djudjeto (‘The Dwarf”) in the autumn of 2001. Up until then, every sale in
Sofia was controlled by a particular “boss,” who was in charge of his respective areas.
A typical organization included a “boss” having between 5 and 20 street dealers along
with their suppliers. These organizations belonged to one of the two groupings
formed around the former VIS and SIC companies. Notably, until the summer of
2002, despite periodic tensions between the two groups, balance has always been
struck. Negotiations among fourth and fifth tier bosses led to the principle of zoning,
with areas of influence coinciding with the police district structure. Each dealer
was assigned to a particular area and “reported” to the area boss. Selling in someone
else’s area, even within a range of 100 meters or so, obtaining stuff from outsider
sources, or working for another area boss was punished (punishments ranged from
battery to crippling). 
It is not by chance that the zoning principle in the capital city follows the police
department districts. According to dealers, this is a direct reflection of the key role
played by the police in distribution within the market.37 Without proper contacts in
the respective police district, it is impossible to defend a “territory.” A typical fee for
a police boss in charge of drugs in a district police department is roughly 15-20 BGN
per dealer per week. The amount that an “area boss” gives on top for keeping the
system intact depends upon the personal arrangements with the “police executive,”38
but amounts range between 10,000 and 20,000 BGN annually. It is known that,
beyond general agreements dealers, suppliers and bosses pay extra in case of 
36 Poli Pantev was shot on 9 March 2001 on the island of Aruba. He was believed to control heroin and
cocaine supplies before his death, but was not involved with the domestic drugs market. 
37 Corruption in law enforcement agencies is key for the evolution of crime in Bulgaria. This issue has
been researched in a specific survey by Coalition 2000 – see http://www.anticorruption.bg. It is also
widely discussed at the top level in the Ministry of the Interior.  
38 2nd and 3rd tier dealers allude to various police officers involved, starting with heads of District
Departments in Sofia and ending with a former head of the Narcotics Department with the National
Police Service. Some of the quoted names were confirmed to have been internally investigated by
the Ministry of the Interior.
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“incidents”. For instance, when a dealer
is caught between 500 and 1000 BGN is
paid for each packet caught. Seizure of
200-300 grams on the third level can cost
a “fee” of as much as 10,000—15,000
BGN. Data on arrangements with the
police is fragmentary and mainly relates
to Sofia’s 3rd, 4th and 6th district police
departments (according to police
insiders, these departments are
notorious as the “most infiltrated”).
Infiltration into the police departments
occurs at different levels. If the boss is
out of reach, his subordinates are then
approached for negotiations. With a staff
of three to four officers per division, it is
possible that some officers are not
corrupt, but typically at least half of their
subordinates benefit from their position.
The usual penalty for police officers who
have been proved to abuse their
position is only a transfer from one
district department to another.
Based on accounts of dealers,
policemen and special services experts, at
present the capital city is roughly divided
into nine areas, mirroring the structure of
the district police departments. These are
the bosses controlling each of the nine
areas: (see Figure 5).
• Area 1 – Rossen Zhivotnoto (“The Animal”)39 is now in Italy. His deputies are
Goundi and Lacho.
• Area 2 – Androvtzite “(The Andreis”) are two bosses. Curiously enough, whoever
comes as the new second is called “Andro” – short from Andrei.
• Area 3 – Kosta and Bobby
• Area 4 – Bobara (“The Beaver”) was preceded by Hamstera (“The Hamster”) and
Nasko but today they report to him. 
• Area 5 – Sigmata.
• Area 6 – Kaloyan Maxa (before him was the notorious Ilyan Versanov).
• Area 7 – Rossen Zhivotnoto (“The Animal”). 
• Area 8 – Rossen Zhivotnoto (“The Animal”).
• Area 9 – Blazho (there have been several attempts to replace him since spring
2003).
One of the important functions of the fourth tier is to manage the so called “black
lawyers” and “hit squads.” These two groups play a critical role in the overall
operation of the networks. 
39 Wherever concrete individuals are mentioned, their media nicknames will be used. 
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Unlike their fellows employed by regular commercial companies, lawyers working
for the drug-structures, also known as “black lawyers,”40 come typically from the
Ministry of Interior system, or have experience as criminal investigators, criminal
prosecutors, or judges. Usually the “black drug lawyers” attack the system on all
levels, from the district police department, where detentions take place, through the
preliminary investigation, and as far as prosecutors and judges—i.Â. they try “to
crack” the case at every single stage of pre-court and court procedures. Thus, they
not only represent and defend their clients, but also perform a particularly visible
intermediary function. Their fees are typically calculated as percentages of what
would have had to have been paid for saving the respective member of the
organization. The more difficult the cases, the larger the amount, and the more
substantial the fees charged. Black lawyers function as a “network.” Cases are
assigned depending on the respective lawyer’s “influence” in various districts or
levels of the law enforcement system. For instance, one lawyer who has previously
worked as an investigator in Sofia’s 3rd district, is now representing defendants in that
district, another having served in the police force of the 4th district, specializes in cases
in that district, etc. In Sofia, most of the cases are covered by some twenty lawyers.
Black lawyers perform additional intermediary services, for instance, arranging
“victims”41 with the police, as well as PR services like handling information to go out
to the media, etc. Notably, apart from coverage by district, the hierarchy here is
relatively clear—ordinary dealers are handled by junior members of the lawyers
community. Unlike their ordinary colleagues, black lawyers risk physical punishment
over lack of success. In general, though, lawyers’ role in the sustainability of the
network is huge. Loyal street dealers are aware that even if they commit a mistake,
they stand a fair chance to evade legal consequences.
Uniquely important for the enforcement of the hierarchy and zoning principles is
the role played by the “hit squads.” The violent force exercised by these special
groups makes it possible to control the delivery of substances, as well as territorial
trespassing. According to available data, large hit squads—similar to those back in
1994-1997—are already difficult to sustain. Instead, each area boss has three to four
people (”a car full”) who take care of discipline. One or two of them may be the
boss’s personal bodyguards. It typically takes two to three to intimidate a dealer, and
when ”more serious measures” are to be taken, a total of ten or so are summoned
from up to four areas. Usually the hit squads get other assignments as well—to collect
interests, punish pimps, shop owners, etc.
Punishments can provisionally be ranked on three levels. 1) Fine—depending on
what kind of violation, fines range from several hundred to several thousand BGN; 2)
Battery—again there are degrees of beating, yet breaking bones and heavy injuries
are avoided; 3) Crippling—ranging from breaking fingers to breaking elbows and
knee caps (i.e. bones that are hard or impossible to heal). 
40 The term ”black lawyer” has also a wider meaning, referring to lawyers related with gray and black
economy, who are experienced in various cases of harsh violations of the Penal Code.
41 To avoid suspicion that a given district police department is not doing their job properly,
arrangements are made with the covering police officers to sacrifice a certain number of street
dealers at the second level. 
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Analysis shows that a participant in a small-team hit squad earns about 300 BGN
a week plus fringe benefits: car, mobile phone, “full board drinking and eating at the
boss’ restaurants,” “prostitutes from the boss’ entourage,” and so on. Fines and other
possessions taken away from the dealers become property of the hit squad. The boss
of the hit squad gets a weekly salary of about 1500 BGN. Furthermore, bosses of hit
squads enjoy a special status and may own a share in business operations. It may
seem paradoxical that a hit squad member gets less than a street dealer, but most
sources confirmed this information. One explanation here would be that the market
of “power services” has shrunk and their pay levels have to take into account the
salary levels in ordinary security firms, which are still half to one third of what
members of the hit squads are paid.
Significantly, frequent changes take place on this fourth level—one can move up
or down within months. Along with the area bosses there are always at least one or
two ”lesser bosses” whose hierarchical position is not clearly defined.42
In the fifth tier are the so-called “big bosses.” Media, police, and politicians alike
often mention the long criminal records of these top players, yet for many reasons
which are outside the scope and ambitions of the present survey, they remain
“untouchable”. The single most important feature of their operation is that they
have sustainable legal businesses securing considerable income. At the same
time, their legal operations are related to “gray” and ”black” economic activities,
thus securing huge supplementary financial, organizational and human resource
for expansion. Pressure in the “black” or “gray” sector of operation may cause a
reduction, or even a stoppage of activity in the line under threat. This constant
transition along the “white-gray-black” line makes it really hard to reach the real
bosses of the fifth tier. For them, drug distribution is just one of many lines of
business. They normally do not get involved in any operational decisions such as who
stands where in the hierarchy, who contributes how much, who is to be punished.
They negotiate and agree on area distributions and set development goals (for
instance, currently small towns are being developed). Along these lines, it is
noteworthy that according to participants in the drug networks, the perceived rivalry
between  former VIS and SIC “employees” is rather a myth that covers the actual
collaboration. Special service experts confirm this observation. As they see it, the
Bulgarian drug-market is moving towards cartelization. It is widely believed that since
early 2002, the old division into VIS people and SIC people has become irrelevant.
As of now they have “merged” to the point of being indistinguishable.
Media investigations, also confirmed by police sources, divide the country into
three big local organizations: Sofia, Varna and Bourgas. About the “three on the top,”
there are only widespread rumors. The media reported that the “three big bosses”
were Konstantin Dimitrov (“Kossyo Samokovetsa”), Meto Ilyanski and Zlatomir
Ivanov.43 On December 6, 2003 Dimitrov was murdered in the center of Amsterdam. 
42 This duplicating and triplicating of levels is reflected in dealers’ interviews like this: “I worked for
Botse, Mitko Babata is under him.” On the other hand, it turns out that Botse, who is a boss, worked
for Mitko Rouski (“The Russian”), who himself “had worked it out with Klyuna” (“The Beak,” area
boss).
43 These names appeared in over 300 publications in the past 2 years. See “168 Chassa” weekly of
23.05.2003 and of 31.01.2003, “Capital” weekly of 17.08.2002 and of 11.01.2003. 
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At the end of November 2003 Ilyanski
disappeared. Reportedly Dimitrov’s
share of the drug market will be most
likely taken over by Klyuna (Anton
Miltenov, “The Beak”).44 Some other
identifiable high-level players are Ivo
Guela in Varna and Mityo Ochite in
Bourgas. 
It is widely believed that until this
point Klyuna was the executive in charge
of the Sofia market. (See box on page 33)
Another frequently mentioned name is
Dembi (Dimitar Voutchev, “The Fat
Guy”),45 the stand-in for Klyuna. These
two were the main characters in
multiple media publications, while
interviewee dealers and police officers
confirmed that they are veritably the
ones who have been running the capital
city in the past 1-2 years. The most
convincing evidence as to their strength
is that they are capable, if need be, of summoning the “most powerful hit squad”
from all areas, which can include up to thirty hit men. It has already been mentioned
that such hit squads do not go into extremes. They are employed to scare and punish
(see the three levels of punishment described above), but not for killings. In the few
cases when such groups used firearms, they were inefficient. It is thought that for
extreme cases bosses on the fourth and fifth level usually hired either “Old Dobri’s
group” or foreigners.46 To sum up, old dealers know people like Klyuna and Dembi
in person, but the real top guys remain unknown.
As for those hovering somewhere between fourth and fifth tiers, like Dembi and
Rossen Zhivotnoto (“The Animal”), they demonstrate the poor discipline typical for
the middle level, well-known from the time of the “power groupings” in the period
1994-1998. It is believed that after the end of the “spill out” period (when heroin was
left in Bulgaria in exchange for assistance in trafficking substances through Bulgarian
territory), and the transition to mainly direct purchasing from Turkey, mid-level
people began to operate on their own more often.
44 “Boyko Borisov: Klyuna will Inherit the Business of Samokovetza,” Dnevnik, December 8, 2003.
45 See “Trud” daily of 19.08.2003, “24 chasa” daily of 21.8.2002, “Tema” weekly magazine of
26.8.2002, “Monitor” daily of 14.9.2002, “Banker” weekly of 28.6.2003.
46 In interviews dealers gave details about the exclusive specialization within the group and the harsh
discipline. It is hard to say how far these were stories inspired by hands-on experience, or by what
was published in the media. A case in point is “Old Dobri’s” group that became media popular after
the arrest of Nikolay Dobrev and five more in late August 2002. Detainees were former special
services officers and at the time of their arrest they had at their disposal large amounts of weapons,
ammunitions and explosives. The Prosecution called this group “a murder factory.” While
investigation was under way it became clear that many of the charges would not hold in court. Court
trial is upcoming.
The Drug Market in Bulgaria 31
BELAN
MITYO OCHITE
KLYUNA
ANDIAMOTO
PETNOTO
KAMILATA
MAIMUNATA
BOBY CANADETZA
MALKIAT ZUM
POPA
GOUVATA
MANIKATA
STOYAN CRAVATA
MITYO OCHITE
VIDIN
MONTANA
VRATZA
PERNIK
KYUSTENDIL
BLAGOEVGRAD
SOFIA
LOVETCH
PLEVEN
PAZARDJIK
PLOVDIV
SMOLYAN
KARDJALI
HASKOVO
STARA ZAGORA YAMBOL
BOURGAS
SLIVEN
VARNA
DOBRICH
SHUMEN
TARGOVISHTE
VELIKO TARNOVO
GABROVO
RAZGRAD
SILISTRA
KOSYO SAMOKOVETZA
ZLATOMIR BARETATA
METO ILYANSKI
Figure 6. Drug market geographic distribution by
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Size of the heroin market. Having revealed the structure of heroin distribution
and the overall operation of the heroin market, the question arises of how much
money this market generates. The estimated size of the Bulgarian heroin market
varies significantly due to considerable variances in initial assumptions. If the average
daily consumption is 10-15 BGN per person, and there are 5,000 to 25,000 drug-
addicts on the heroin market, the annual revenue ranges between 55 to 135 million
BGN. This estimate may prove to be quite exaggerated, since addicts do not always
manage to take their daily dose of heroin—most of them quit time and again in
attempts to overcome their addiction. 
Crisis. The described structure and operation of the drug network in Sofia supports
the conclusion that the drugs market has reached a mature stage. However, changes
that took place from the fall of 2002 on, give grounds to the belief that the existing drug
organizations were beginning to fall apart. There are numerous symptoms that testify to
a systematic crisis in the distribution of heroin. The changes occur extremely quickly,
and whether the current structure remains relevant depends largely upon
developments in the second half of 2003. The catalyst of this crisis appears to have been
many internal and external events. The external factors include changes in consumer
behavior in some big Western-European drug markets, namely the transition from
heroin to cocaine. It is difficult to predict how this “shift” would affect the heroin traffic
via Bulgaria, and consequently the domestic heroin market. Another important change
is the increased activity of the Turkish special services (resulting in a series of
disclosures), which supposedly created difficulties for the Bulgarian drug importers in
maintaining their contacts with Turkish heroin laboratories. 
While external changes are hard to identify, evidence about internal turbulence
on almost all levels is readily available. An outline of these changes follows. 
On the first level, a general and continuous drop in the number of heroin users
has been observed. There are several reasons for that. 
Demographic slide – due to continuously declining birth rates in the 1980s, there
are fewer and fewer young people entering drug-use age (i.e. the size of peer groups,
people born in the same year, is shrinking year after year). 
Experience gained in heroin abuse. As a result of the “heroin outbreak” since late
1990s, horrifying evidence of the consequences of drug abuse is to be found in almost
every school and every neighborhood in big cities. Therefore, even kids with deviant
behavior prefer to refrain from heroin experiments. 
Due to the deteriorating quality of the street heroin (confirmed by data from
chemical analysis), smaller numbers of new addicts are being recruited. Indications are
there that the number of those who ”get hooked” after their first try has dropped
abruptly. 
Unlike the period 1993-2000 when drug networks were growing every year, the
current trend is of shrinking revenue from drugs trade. “Pressure from below”
creates powerful tensions within the drug networks—as confirmed by both street
dealers and current police data. Since early 2002, the average number of customers
serviced by one street dealer is going down (from 30-40 to 20-25 in mid-2003),
resulting in poorer earnings. As a consequence, the recruitment of new dealers
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becomes problematic, and permanent conflicts among them arise. The “human
resource crisis” in the street network is described by old dealers like this: “in the past
year some areas were served mainly by young novices who got busted all the time.”
“The crisis from below” coincides with a “crisis at the top,” which, on the fourth
and fifth levels, according to police and dealers alike, started after the death of Poli
Pantev and became even worse after the murder of Lyonya Djudjeto (Leonid Fotev,
“The Dwarf”).47 Up until then, Lyonya Djudjeto maintained the balance between the
various groups in the drug-networks of Sofia, which were divided into two camps - VIS
and SIC. In the summer of 2002 the situation went out of control. Judging by many
signs, it can be assumed that the crisis started after a fight among the fourth and fifth tier
bosses over unsettled payments—the legalization of their capitals in the autumn of
2001 and the spring of 2002 took the form of an overinvestment in tourism.48 What
added fuel to the crisis was the shooting of one of the fourth tier bosses—Ilyan
Versanov, who confessed to the police in order to protect himself from execution.
Following his testimony, a lawsuit was started against Klyuna (Anton Miltenov,
“The Beak”), and after a search, it was announced in the autumn of 2002 that
most on his team/hit squad were arrested: Dimitar V. (“Dembi”), Redjhan R.
(“Roko”), Bisser I., Alexander V. (“The Cabbage”), Kiril K. (“The Tip”), Tzvetan D.
and Rossen P. On 10 September, 2002 Georgi N. was arrested after forensic
evidence proved that he was the one who had shot Versanov with an automatic
machine gun Kalashnikov, provided by Rossen P.
The shooting was said to be Klyuna’s response to a previous sniper attack
against him on 27 June, 2002, when he was shot on the balcony of his house in
the Knyazhevo area around Sofia. He turned himself in to the police investigation
office on 21 January, 2003 and spent some time in prison.
At present, Klyuna is free on a bail of 4,500 BGN, confirmed by Sofia City
Court on 9 May. Also on the loose—bailed out for 3,000 BGN—is Dimitar
Vouchev (“Dembi”). According to the latest data, only one out of seven members
of Klyuna’s group is in detention. 
The charges pressed against Klyuna and his people include “attempted
murder of Ilyan Versanov in a manner and means threatening the lives of many,
and conducted by preliminary arrangement.” In addition, Bisser I.,Rossen P. and
Georgi N. will be charged for illegal possession of arms. Court sources quote the
evidence collected so far on the case as sufficient to convict the drug-dealers.49 
47 Murdered on 16 September, 2001 by Petar Petrov-Kyustendiletsa, who was under cocaine
intoxication.
48 The widely accepted explanation among “crime and gray” bosses is that early August 2002 made it clear
that the return from tourism has been overestimated, and high interest rates of “black credits” turned
out unserviceable (unavailability of regular bank credits had allowed crime structures to lend at very
high interest rates). Furthermore, the consequences from “investing white” are manifold. According to
lawyers in service to the leaders of “shadow” structures, the main underlying problem lies in ill-defined
“oral contracts” and the absence of tradition to observe agreed upon contracts. Conflicts arise not only
over debts, but also over property concession, partnerships with competitors, etc. 
49 Banker weekly 02.08.2003 „.
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Similar charges were pressed in Bourgas, and the detention of key figures like
Klyuna and Mityo Ochite (“Mityo the Eyes”) and their entourage had a negative effect
on discipline among the players of the big drug-markets. Their continuous absence
from “operational coordination” led to fourth tier bosses starting to work on their
own. In this respect, it is revealing that since the crisis of the summer of 2002 street
dealers are no longer given ready-made doses of heroin—a method used to avert
dilution.50 Discipline has slackened to near collapse in the second and third levels,
and fast and loose use of “hit squads” in the summer of 2002 and 2003 deteriorated
the situation even further. The crisis at the top was exacerbated by the attempts of
big bosses to drop out of the drug business. The trend to transfer capital from the
“black sector” and invest in the “white” leaves the drug market with less and less
financial resources. The result is the extremely low quality of heroin bought from
Turkey. According to the NSBOP, purity of wholesale heroin has been slashed to 10-
12%, which was the grade of heroin offered on the second level in 1999-2000. Now
the street dose of heroin is usually at 4%, but can drop to as low as 2%. 
2.2. THE SOFT DRUG MARKET
After the big criminal organizations entered the “soft drug” trade (marijuana,
hashish, and other forms of cannabis) at the end of the 1990s, the market in 2003
remains split between independent small dealers, working directly with producers and
selling to “circles of friends,” and the criminal organizations. Naturally, organized crime
was not happy to share the market. Therefore, regular attempts were made to oust or
bring under control the independent dealers. According to police data, in most of the
country’s large cities big criminal structures periodically gain control over “the
street” (the public selling places of grass). Various methods for securing this control
are known, like marking the substances51 or “checks” of the users at public places
where grass is smoked. According to independent dealers, a portion of the police
campaigns against the dealers are triggered by “purposeful signals” to the police, with
the purpose of clearing the area. Examples in Sofia include operations against sales in
“Studentski grad” (Students’ City) and the centrally located green areas (the Monument
to the Soviet Army, the monument to Patriarch Evtimii, and elsewhere). Despite all
effort, this market continues to be difficult to control on the part of organized crime.
The main reason is that the “entry threshold” for an independent dealer is very low,
thanks to easy access to raw substances, and low prices. Typical are stories of high
school, or university student sellers of “soft drugs,” who supply themselves from a piece
of land they have found, “so that not to pay thick-necked thugs” (the so-called “mutri”).
Having met their personal needs, they start making money by selling surplus drugs
within their own closed circles. There are also the “young entrepreneurs,” who enter
the market for profit’s sake only. Clash with organized criminal structures usually takes
place when the “circle of friends” expands, or the respective criminal group “captures”
a user from the independent dealer’s circle. 
50 To limit the possibility of dilution on the 1st and 2nd level, doses are pre-packaged in the form of the so-
called “straps.” Doses come stuck to a strap and a 1st level dealer gets a strap with the respective number
of doses, depending on the number of his known customers, and the respective cash amount is owed.
Straps are also an efficient control mechanism on the 2nd level. As different from Sofia, ready-made doses
keep being used in smaller towns, where large amounts have been confiscated (in Rousse and Pleven).
51 In Sofia the practice is to put stamps on paper bags that contain grass, and sometimes even on the
rolling paper.
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Notably, along with the number of “dealers to friends,” there is a significant
portion of users who grow their own cannabis, helped by the favorable climate and
already developed seed market. 
Organized crime has also to consider the relatively small size of the soft drug
market. Based on experience in other countries, confirmed to be relevant for the
Bulgarian market as well, some 90% of the overall consumption of soft drugs is
attributed to regular users. Therefore, approximately 4,000-5,000 kilograms are
consumed per year. With retail prices ranging from 800 and 1,000 BGN per kilogram,
the estimated size of the market is 3.2 million to 5 million BGN. Besides the relatively
small market, dealers working for criminal groupings cannot take advantage of the
security offered by mobile phone sales. The low price of soft drugs makes mobile
orders too expensive at this point. 
On the other hand, the country’s organized crime cannot afford to abandon the
“soft drug” market altogether. First of all, this is the largest market in terms of
number of users. Analysis of demand (see Part 3) demonstrated that the users of “soft
drugs” number around 30,000–50,000 regular users, and about just as many
accidental ones. In comparison with Western Europe and the former socialist
countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, the 1.5%
penetration (those who “have tried”) is low, and stable growth can be expected in the
near future. Such expectations are confirmed by registered levels of penetration in
high schools (as high as 30% in some cities). Secondly, earnings from heroin are
expected to continue to decline, thus making soft drugs more attractive to organized
crime.
2.3. THE SYNTHETIC DRUG MARKET
As shown in the first section, the manufacturing of amphetamines in Bulgaria has
a long history, and after 1998—with the focused effort of organized crime—this
group of psychoactive substances began to gain grounds on the mass domestic
market. Just like the heroin trade, the trade in synthetic drugs is practically fully
controlled by the big criminal structures. Domestic consumption is mainly satisfied by
domestic output and one can safely assume that it is dominated by the same big
criminal structures. On the other hand, some of the apprehended traffickers and
workers in drug laboratories, belong to relatively small criminal organizations
exporting amphetamines to the Middle East. Two parallel systems for
manufacturing synthetic drugs seem to co-exist. One, which is part of Bulgarian
organized crime and targets the internal market, and a second, focusing on exports,
consists of single criminal entrepreneurs. Comparisons of quantities seized at the
border with data on internal consumption shows that export production is several
times higher than the domestic market. Therefore, this production has to meet the
requirements of the Middle East market for very low prices, which in turn leads to
very low quality. This is probably the main reason why the quality of synthetic drugs
offered in the country is so low.
Developments in early 2003 signal a very dangerous tendency. With the decline
of heroin consumption, organized crime groups focused upon increasing the supply
of synthetic drugs. A series of in-depth interviews with long-term heroin addicts,
carried out in the spring and summer of 2003, made it clear that the wave of
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combined use of heroin and amphetamines is sweeping. On the other hand, while
up until mid-2002 adolescents typically took powder or pills, it is becoming more and
more common at present to “sniff” amphetamines in imitation of techniques learned
from cocaine use. The active substance is divided into parts, shaped into lines, and
sniffed through a straw. 
A comparison is possible with Western Europe in this respect. In the past couple
of years, users of heroin have been switching to cocaine. For a country like Bulgaria
such a “shift” would hardly work, due to the very high price of cocaine. Therefore,
amphetamines become a natural, cheap surrogate, or as some experts call it, “the
cocaine of the poor.” 
Data about “switching” from heroin to amphetamines is as yet too scarce and
fragmentary. According to police and special services (who are also registering such
a trend) the “heroin crisis” forced many fourth and fifth level bosses to “remake” their
heroin networks into those that distribute amphetamines. Before early 2003, the
heroin market and the market of synthetic drugs were very different, and “physically”
separate. For instance, amphetamine dealers offered their substances mainly at
restaurants and cafes, while heroin dealers—as mentioned above—took orders over
the phone and delivered the drugs at arranged meetings. At present, as evidence
from police analysis and interviews with drug-users show, in certain big cities these
two distinct networks are beginning to merge. Bulgarian drug-related organizations
are trying to make use of the existing manufacturing and human resource potential.
Police busts in the summer of 2003 suggested that the architects of these
industries are trying to “close up” the production-distribution process by cutting
out the expensive and risky part of the system abroad.52 What is innovative and
different is that with their new manufacturing capacity, the aim is to expand the
number of participating laboratories as far as possible. Drug organizations have not
only mastered old, existing technology for the manufacturing of amphetamines,
but they have also tried to make them mass-producible, turning drug production
into a technology as “simple as alcohol distillation, practiced on a mass scale by
Bulgarians.” The aim is to set up several hundreds of laboratories that will
deliberately work on an irregular basis—in order to minimize the risk. The
structure created by the architects of the system resembles that of the renowned
cocaine “sand clock” scheme.53 According to this scheme, the widest upper part
of the inverted triangle is occupied by the “workers,” hundreds of people, who
receive cheap equipment, precursors, and accurate instructions (to minimize
errors via simple technology). Below them are several dozens of couriers handling
the shipping of precursors, sub-products, and the amphetamine output. The
second to last level is taken by those organizing the import of precursors,54
52 For the first time laboratories have been discovered that produce predominantly for the Bulgarian
market. Up until 2003, 13 laboratories were found whose output went for export. Similar is the
tendency with captured couriers shipping amphetamines bulk.  
53 Peter Reuter, “Do Middle Markets for Drugs Constitute an Attractive Target for Enforcement” (2003).
54 There is strong evidence suggesting that to avoid the risk of crossing borders, production facilities
have been set up in Bulgaria for the “total synthesis” of precursors. 
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chemical engineers,55 while the
bottleneck of the scheme is saved for the
bosses. At this point, the regular pyramid
starts, which is similar to that of heroin
distribution (see Figure 7)—upper levels
for distribution bosses, then the
suppliers, hundreds of street dealers,
and finally the widest section of the
pyramid made up by tens of thousands
of users. What is new is that expensive
qualified chemical engineers do not
assume risk any longer. The whole point
of the “sand clock” scheme is that the
risk is greatest for those at the bottom of
the hierarchy—the laboratory “workers”
who function similarly to the street
dealers, and are easily replaceable
without incurring significant financial
losses. Therefore, laboratories are
scattered all over the country in small
towns producing several kilograms of
sub-products, or at the end-units,
producing several kilograms of
amphetamines. A key role for the
operation of this structure is played by
“hit squads” and “black lawyers,”
described above in the discussion of
heroin distribution. 
It is extremely difficult to estimate the earnings generated from synthetic drug use.
Due to the recent abrupt growth of amphetamine use, the data collected by
representative surveys is outdated. Besides, patterns of use are highly irregular,
depending on the season, particular events, etc., and prices vary significantly by place
and time (from 0.50 to 15 BGN per dose). 
55 According to special services experts, many indications are there that some of the most prominent
Bulgarian chemists have been put under pressure and recruited by members of organized crime.
Particular attention was paid to those who had taken part in developing technologies for the
production of captagon. In proof of this assertion come the ostentatious killing of the daughter of a
famous chemist, and the detention of several individuals working with non-controlled chemicals that
are suspected to be used in exotic technologies for the production of amphetamines. 
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Figure 7. Production and distribution of amphetamines
Source: CSD and National Service for Combating Organized Crime
2.4. BULGARIAN DRUG-RELATED ORGANIZED CRIME AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
FOR THE FUTURE OF DRUG-DISTRIBUTION IN THE COUNTRY
At the early stages of this survey, our hypothesis was that—despite media and
public opinion—he perception that there exists drug-related organized crime, and
even a mafia, was false, and that the reality of drug-distribution would prove those
beliefs have little to do with reality. Our hypothesis was supported by studies and
analyses in Western and Eastern Europe proving that even in countries like Italy and
Russia, with traditionally strong organized crime, drug-traffic and drug-distribution
are predominantly the domain of small organizations and individual players.56
Analysis of primary information, police, and special services data showed that drug-
trafficking and distribution in Bulgaria is carried out by a special alliance of three to
four big criminal drug networks.57 As demonstrated in our discussion of the
hierarchy of drug organizations, this “alliance” has divided the market internally on
the principles of zoning and hierarchy in the structure of supplies. The operation of
such an organization is made possible by implementing various negotiating
mechanisms for assigning control over territories among the existing criminal groups,
and also by maintaining specialized units to exert pressure (“hit squads”) and to
protect the players at each level from prosecution by the state (“lawyer networks”).58
56 PAOLI, L. (2002): Flexible Hierarchies and Dynamic Disorder: The Drug Distribution System in
Frankfurt and Milan. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy. “The ”Invisible Hand” of the Market:
Illegal Drug Trade in Germany, Italy, and Russia”, Venice: 12th Annual Conference of the European
Society of Social Drug Research, 5.10.2001 (Paoli); K.Krajewski  “Drug  Trafficking in Poland”,  Cross-
Border Crime in a Changing Europe (2001). 
57 Bulgarian drug organizations resemble the organizational schemes of South-American heroin
organizations (loose confederations of several organizations and dealers), which smuggled and sold
in the USA during the new heroin wave in the 1990s. 
58 The response to the question of why Bulgarian drug trafficking and drug distribution became part of
organized crime is related to the genesis of organized crime. This text is unable to consider the details
of the emergence and development of existing forms of organized crime. For the sake of better
understanding the interpretation of drug distribution schematically offered here, the prerequisites for
the genesis of big Bulgarian criminal structures will be outlined below. 1) The structure of the
judiciary established in the Bulgarian constitution at the start of transition included three fairly
independent units—court, prosecution, and investigation. Given that the balance between units is
disrupted and legal mechanisms are imperfect, the prevention, disclosure, and penalization of
criminal acts or breaches of law could not be wholly efficient. 2) Existence of a “natural backbone”
for organized crime in the face of large and solid sports communities (trained in the special network
of sports schools formerly supported by the state). 3) Unique opportunities provided by the embargo
against Yugoslavia (imposed because of the war there) This plays the role that “prohibition” did in the
USA. This facilitates the criminal groups with huge financial resources and international channels. As
a result apart from enormous contraband in former Yugoslavia, many side lines are developed
ranging from car thefts and smuggling mass consumption goods to power insurance. 4) Bulgaria was
among the weakest states in Eastern Europe through the years of 1990-1997 and the new political
elites had neither the time nor the resources to counter big criminal leaders. 5) After the state became
stable in 1997-1998, the condition of law enforcement and the judicial system allowed for the big
organized structures to adapt, and to redirect their capital into “gray and pure white enterprises.”  
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Historically, police, and special units monitoring drug related crimes around the
world have been able to collect the most information about the lowest levels (e.g. the
retail sellers), less information about the “suppliers” (the middle level), while data
about the highest layers of the drug hierarchy is scarce and hypothetical. During the
collection of primary information, we came across the following Bulgarian paradox.
A lot was known about all “layers” of drug-distribution practically by everybody—
drug-addicts, dealers, suppliers, police, and even journalists. It turned out that the
higher the level in question, the clearer the picture. The reason for not having
accurate information about the lowest level is pretty simple—the great variety of
players and the general state of chaos, exacerbated by high rates of turnover among
the dealers and constant organizational changes affecting the middle layer. In
addition, there is a certain overlapping of functions, and a lack of clearly defined
“roles.”59
Our initial assumption that the stories about the “highest levels” of the drug
hierarchy are the product of journalistic imagination was again proved untrue. Drug-
dealers and police officers alike confirmed—with no precautions—which of the big
drug bosses controls what territory and what their status is in the overall organization.
In reality, everybody spoke about everybody and everything, and the major problem
appeared to be how to decide where reality ended and imagination came into play.
Evidently, factors like the country’s small size (its overall consumption equals that of
a German or American town with a population of 200,000), the transition from one
social model to another (after the collapse of the Soviet system), the traditionally
nepotistic society, “the culture of gossip,” and other socio-cultural specifics
create a unique atmosphere of “know” and “feel no consequences.”
Although those at the top of the Bulgarian drug-business seem to have been
known for years, there is no evidence of their activity—hence, there are no
consequences for them. This probably preconditions their behavior—they avoid
extreme actions and explain the whole situation in terms of, “let us all do our
business; we satisfy certain market demands; the police talk to the media about us;
the media write and sell their circulations, etc.”
We may need to focus further on the specifics of Bulgarian organized crime. We
believe that organized crime of the Italian, Latin American, Russian, Caucasian,
Turkish, and other types, as described in textbooks, could not possibly exist in
Bulgaria, mainly due the country’s size. In order for a big criminal organization to
survive in a “shallow” and “primitive” market (there is hardly any high tech
production left), it has to operate as a network of many small organizations.
Certain member organizations function as regular commercial companies,
performing a variety of roles, from criminal to fully legal ones. In the peculiar
Bulgarian cultural environment, purely market relations are intertwined with friendly,
kinship and clientele relationships, making it hard to draw a line between the gray
and the black. 
59 However paradoxical it may seem, this traditional Balkan chaos creates possibilities for a special kind
of flexibility and adaptability of the country’s drug distribution. 
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The typical model used by big criminal structures has bosses from the top
participating in dozens of commercial companies of various configurations, including
(as partners) people at their level, as well as middle-level people. These firms own
other firms, and they, in turn, own others, thus forming a network of which small
parts may be sacrificed without losing the whole. When a certain section of the
network is destroyed, its functions are taken over by other sections. There are many
cases when, after dozens of dealers and their bosses have been arrested, the drug
trade in the affected area is restored at its previous level within several days. A
prominent Bulgarian boss with mathematical background compares his organization
to “the operation of the Internet.” 
We must emphasize that Bulgarian drug distribution is not simply one of the many
sectors of organized crime.60 Compared with the other forms of organized crime in
Bulgaria, it is the best integrated into the international criminal organizations, it
has the largest number of participants, and it has accordingly developed as the
most sophisticated hierarchical criminal structure in the country. Bulgarian drug-
related organizations are also well-linked to the remaining forms of organized crime
in the country—from the traffic of stolen automobiles to illegal emigration and the
export of archeological artifacts. On the other hand, there is no evidence so far
confirming the hypothesis that the drug networks use or have used their considerable
resources to exert systematic influence on Bulgarian judicial and political elites.61
Therefore, no grounds are there to define the existing network of drug
organizations as mafia. Nevertheless, from what has been said, conclusions can be
drawn that drug-related crime in Bulgaria determines the structure of the
Bulgarian organized crime and deserves special attention. 
The future of drug distribution can be traced into three most probable scenarios,
which naturally may not cover all existing possibilities. The first scenario, provisionally
called “optimistic,” assumes that state and civil organizations will propose massive
methadone programmes in the capital city and in the most inflicted towns. They will
be very likely to push out of the “drug market” a significant number of drug addicts
and will abruptly cut down the profits of organized drug-related crime. This will 
60 Academic and political debate has not arrived at a unanimous definition of organized crime. American
and North European scholars often equate organized crime to the provision of illegal goods and
services: Frank Hagan claims that a consensus exists among American criminologists that organized
crime involves a continuing enterprise operating in a rational fashion and focused toward obtaining
profits through illegal activities (Hagan, 1983). If this definition is accepted, it is obvious that illegal
drug production and trafficking represents a form of organized crime. However, many scholars and
particularly politicians interpret organized crime not so much as a set of illegal activities, but rather as
a set of large-scale organizations that are either illegal per se or are predominantly involved in illegal
activities. This second interpretation is well illustrated by the following definition: “organized crime
consists of organizations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal
activities. The Mafia provides the most enduring and significant form of organized crime” (Reuter,
1985, p. 175). In our discussion of the specifics of Bulgarian drugs distribution we have applied this
second definition of organized crime.
61 Some very drastic examples should not be missed here, which give rise to doubts among crime
experts. The most outstanding case here was the “Opitzvet case” over which the court decided that
330 kg of ready amphetamine base and 666 kg of benzilmethilketon discovered (see first part for
more detail) were meant for “personal use.”
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additionally deepen the “crisis in heroin distribution” and lead to the collapse of the
already loose confederation of drug organizations, weakened by the constantly
degrading quality of street heroin. At the same time the bodies responsible for fighting
drug distribution will manage the ongoing restructuring to set up an efficient system
to respond to new drug-related threats. As a result, the risk related to drug abuse will
subside. 
The second, “realistic” scenario, takes as its starting point that the current crisis in
the heroin related market is a normal cyclical event similar to recurring crises
observed in the USA and Western Europe. Unfortunately, a large heroin market has
already been established, and it will not take long to reinvest and secure its old, high
profits. The major problem of countries like Bulgaria is that geographically it stands
on the heroin road to Europe. The close proximity of big heroin producers makes the
fast import of quality drugs possible, which can bring about a new heroin outbreak
within months.62
The third, “pessimistic” scenario draws on the already described possibility of an
outbreak of synthetic drugs. If we accept that a “normalization” of the heroin
distribution is possible and that it accomplishes the establishment of a new big
“market of amphetamines,” it can be expected that the relatively low drug use in our
country will reach the levels of the most affected countries in Eastern Europe (e.g. the
Czech Republic). Further contributing to this pessimistic prognosis is the fact that few
have managed to “walk out” of the high levels of organized crime in Bulgaria. The
reason, as demonstrated by Bulgarian experience, so far has been that former drug
bosses manage to sustain their “white business” only by keeping “one foot back in the
black one.” Developments in the past two to three years have proved that going out
of the “black zone” only enables new players to gain access to abandoned resources;
and the least that could happen to the former drug boss would be to lose a “white”
business secured with so much effort. Along these lines, it can be hypothesized that,
given the present condition of the Bulgarian state, the black sector is the guarantee
for access to the power instruments without which there is no survival for anyone
with a gray-black past.
62 Afghan poppy fields and Turkish heroin laboratories.
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3. ASSESSMENT OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCE (PAS) USE AND 
ABUSE IN BULGARIA 
By outlining the genesis and current state of drug distribution in Part 1 and Part 2,
the study examines the issue of drug supply. This section will canvass drug use and
abuse from the perspective of demand. 
Evidence from international and Bulgarian research of the topic, information
gathered by NGOs, police, and specialized services’ analyses and medical statistics
shows that drug users in Bulgaria are not a homogeneous group. They can be
categorized according to at least two criteria.63
The first one distinguishes between users of the different types of drugs. Following
this criterion three relatively independent markets can be identified:
• soft drugs market (cannabis, marijuana, hashish, etc.);
• synthetic drugs market (amphetamines);
• heroin market;
• there is also a fourth, eclectic market, for psychoactive substances of low usage
rates—from cocaine to LSD and hallucinogenic mushrooms.
The second typology is based on the pattern of consumption and the level of
dependency on the respective psychoactive substance. The European monitoring
center for drug abuse (EMCDDA) standards differentiate between three
subgroups relevant to the pattern of use:
• experimental users, or such that have tried any drug (at least once in their life—
lifetime prevalence);
• users64 (all who declare to have taken any type of drug during the last
12 months—recreational drug use);
• problem drug users (dependent users being a portion of the subgroup)—
respondents claiming to have used any type of drug during the last 30 days.65
Using the above criteria we will attempt to evaluate drugs demand in Bulgaria.
63 For a detailed description of the methodology employed see Appendix 1.
64 The term prevalence is used as a generic term for all respondents that have tried any drug at least once
in their lives, or use it occasionally or frequently. The terms consumers and users should not be
confused. 
65 This subgroup has been assessed not only by means of population surveys data, but also through
police statistics and drug care NGO information.
66 The Center for the Study of Democracy and the sociological agency Vitosha Research conducted the
first population surveys in this country on drug use and abuse in December 2002–January 2003 and
June–July 2003 (For more details see Appendix 1).
3.1. SOFT DRUG USE 
The hypothesis that soft drugs would be in popular use among PAS consumers was
confirmed across national population surveys.66 Since they are used so massively, the
classification of their main users according to the above criteria is significant.
The formulation of the question should be taken into account in the assessment
of the number and class of users of the different types of drugs. Direct or indirect
questions67 produce different assessment results.
The percentage of positive responses to the direct question“Have you, in the last
12 months, taken cannabis, marijuana, hashish (joint, ganja, pot)”, in January 2003 was
0.5% with a negligible variation in July the same year. In terms of relative numbers
measured against the population of the country it can be stated that the so called
users (recreational drug use) are approximately 30,000–35,000 people.
Two types of questions were used to put together the profile of users who have
tried a certain drug (lifetime prevalence). In January 2003 the question was
formulated as “Have you personally tried (any type of drug)?” where the soft type of
psychoactive substances are enumerated.68 The percentage of respondents who had
tried cannabis was 0.4%, while those that had tired marijuana and hashish were
0.5% (Table 1). In July 2003 all soft drugs were included in a single question.69 As a
result, the percentage of people declaring to have tried rose to 1.5%.
The analysis of answers from January
2003 revealed a near 50% overlap of the
two user subgroups: those of cannabis
and those of marijuana and hashish. The
answers measured as a relative number
indicated that those who had tried
(lifetime prevalence) in January 2003 were
approximately 66,000–68,000 people.
The rate of positive answers in July
2003, when the question fully coincided
with that of EMCDDA and combined the
two subgroups of drugs into one
(cannabis, marijuana and hashish), was
1.5%. This corresponds to 93,000
–96,000 people (aged 18 +). This slight
increase is within the bias limits and
constitutes no sufficient grounds for
conclusions of an increase in the last six
months.
67 See Appendix 1 on the methodology of national surveys conducted by the Center for the Study of
Democracy and Vitosha Research.
68 The questions mentioned parenthetically are the various appellations (including slang words) under
which this group of drugs were popular. The fact that soft drugs are in two separate groups resulted
from pilot survey outcomes, in which the respondents  stated to have smoked cannabis, but to not
have used marijuana.
69 “Have you personally tried cannabis, marijuana, hashish (joint, ganja, pot)?”
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Table 1. Use of Soft Drugs (%)
15+ 15–30 
Using now Tried before Using now Tried before
January 2003 (The survey was conducted among population aged 15+)
Cannabis 0.5 0.4 0.7 1.4
Marijuana, hashish 
(ganja, joint) 0.5 0.5 0.8 2.0
July 2003 (The survey was conducted among population aged 18+)
Cannabis, marijuana,  
hashish (joint, ganja, pot) 0.4 1.5 NA NA
Source: Vitosha Research
With indirect questions like “Would
you try?” and “Do you have personal
acquaintances who have used cannabis,
marijuana, hashish (joint, ganja, pot) 
during the last 12 months?,” the
percentage of users was quite higher, as
expected—between 1.4% and 1.5%, or
90,000–100,000 people.
The rate was even higher with the
subgroup of those who had tried—
1.8–1.9% which is equal to nearly
120,000–130,000 people (Table 2 and
Figure 8).
However, a thorough socio-demo-
graphic analysis of soft drug use would
be impossible to make due to the small
number of replies confirming use or
trying.
A notable fact is the percentage of
people aged 15–30 who are positive of
having tried, which is three to four times
as high (see Table 2). Their number is
even bigger with indirect questions,
where it reaches 4.2–5.2%, or between
70,000 and 90,000 people.
The data may be juxtaposed to
information collected up to now by the
National Center for Addictions (NCA), to
help complete the picture of trying 
and use among high school students.
The NCA, though, has gathered
representative data only for particular
cities in different years for 6 to 12 grade
students (aged 12–18).70
70 Data comparison of the two surveys establishes much higher levels with both subgroups—those
having tried and those using. The disparity may be caused by one of two factors. Either the survey
examined the most affected portion of the population, i.e. high school students in the biggest cities. (Soft
drug penetration obviously displays much higher values in Sofia and the other large cities like Plovdiv,
Varna, and Bourgas). Or the data was influenced by the data collection pattern used. The national
population survey employed home interviews, while the NCA conducted interviews at schools. It
may be assumed that students have tried to show fictitious awareness and experience for reasons of
popularity.
Table 2. Indirect estimate of those who have tried
and those currently using drugs: (January 2003,%)
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Source: Vitosha Research
15+ 15–30 
Tried before Using now Tried before Using now
Cannabis 1.9 1.4 4.2 3.0
Marijuana, hashish 
(ganja, joint) 1.8 1.5 5.2 3.0
130 000
Estimated to have tried
Estimated regular 
users 100 000
35 000
Regular users
(0,4–0,5%)
Declared to have 
tried (1–1,5%)
68 000
Figure 8. Structure of soft drug users according to 
direct and indirect questions
Source: Vitosha Research
Still, data from those two national
surveys demonstrate that soft drugs
penetration is much higher in larger
cities. NCA survey results confirm this
conclusion—the percentage of students
in Sofia and Plovdiv who have tried 71
varies between 12% and 24% (Table 3).
The situation with those using is similar
(Table 4). Some probing surveys in
Bourgas 72 and Varna show comparable
values of lifetime prevalence.
The rate of positive replies to the
question “Do you personally know any
people who use cannabis, marijuana,
hashish (joint, ganja, pot), during the
survey in July 2003 was 7.7%. The high
rate of “knowing” people using soft
drugs in comparison to the other types of
drugs makes it possible to obtain a
penetration profile according to the
basic socio-demographic variables
(Figure 9). The percentage approximates
the level of those who confirm to have
drug using acquaintances in January
2003, i.e. 7.3%.73
71 The comparison of data of the two cities is problematic because the survey for Sofia was conducted
in year 2000 among 9 and 12 grade students, while in Plovdiv it was carried out two years later
comprising students from 6 to 12 grade.
72 A Dose of Love Association inquiry conducted at the start of 2003.
73 The question was: “Do you have friends and/or acquaintances who use drugs?” (Vitosha Research).
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Table 3. Lifetime prevalence among students (%)
Source: National Center for Addictions
Sofia, 2000 Plovdiv, 2002 
Marijuana 24.0 12.3
Hashish 6.4 4.5
Other varieties of cannabis 8.3 7.2
Table 4. Last-year and last-month prevalence 
among students (%)
Sofia, 2000 Plovdiv, 2002 
During the During the During the During the
last 12 months last 30 days last 12 months last 30 days
Marijuana 13.7 9.8 8.4 6.2
Hashish 3.2 1.8 2.7 1.8
Other 
varieties of  4.6 3.0 4.9 2.6
cannabis
Source: National Center for Addictions
The socio-demographic profile of soft
drug users corresponds to expectations.
There is a visible pattern that a high level
of penetration should relate to a high
status of the group surveyed (with regard
to education and income).
The data also met the expectation
that the most endangered social group
with regard to age were people between
18 and 30. It is evident that 30 years is
the limit beyond which soft drug
consumption plummets. Location
defines a similar pattern—penetration in
the capital is nearly twice as high as in
other big cities, while lowest values are
observed in rural areas and villages.
As to ethnic group characteristics, the
survey data coincides with findings from
other surveys and expert assessments
showing that Roma are most affected by
the drug problem, while Bulgarians from
Turkish origin are most conservative.
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Figure 9. Distribution of “those who know drug users” 
by socio-demographic characteristics (July 2003)
Ethnic group Financial status 
Base: N = 1921 Base: N = 1921
Age Location
Base: N = 1921 Base: N = 1921
Degree of education 
Base: N = 1921
Source: Vitosha Research
3.2. SYNTHETIC DRUG USE
Synthetic drugs rate second in terms
of the number of users. As elucidated by
the national population survey, the
direct question provoked no
embarrassment in respondents who
described their own and their friends’
experience in a fairly open manner.
In January 2003 replies to the
question“Have you ever used amphe-
tamines and/or ecstasy?”74 registered as
little as 0.1% users among the 15–30
year-olds. In absolute numbers, users
(recreational drug use) were no more
than 1,700 people.
The question“Have you ever tried?”
received positive replies by 0.7% of
respondents, i.e. the group of those who
had tried (lifetime prevalence)
comprised 47,000–48,000 people.
The indirect estimate of users was
0.7%, while that of those who tried—at
1%, which is 67,000–68,000 people
respectively (Table 5 and Figure 10).
74 In experts’ opinion, ecstasy is exceptionally rare in Bulgaria, while experience has shown that when
respondents mention ecstasy, it most often refers to locally produced amphetamines.
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Table 5. Synthetic drugs users (January 2003,%)
15+ 15–30 
Tried before Using now Tried before Using now
Direct estimate of 
amphetamines, ecstasy 0.7 – 0.8 0.1
Indirect estimate of 
amphetamines, ecstasy 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.9
67 500
Estimated to have tried
Declared to have tried
47 0001 700
Respondents that 
"use heroin"
Figure 10. Structure of synthetic drug users according to 
direct and indirect questions.
Source: Vitosha Research
Source: Vitosha Research
The comparison between findings of
the national population survey of
January 2003 and these of the Plovdiv
and Sofia surveys of the National Center
for Addictions indicates much lower
differences than with soft drugs (Tables
6 and 7). The data gathered in Bourgas in
2003 should also be foregrounded. They
show that the percentage of those who
have tried at schools is twice as big, i.e.
4.3%. Such higher consumption may be
explained with the higher supply level in
this city.
3.3 USE OF HEROIN 
One of the primary and most complex tasks is the measurement of the number of
heroin users. They are the group at greatest risk and this is a serious challenge in a
variety of aspects, from healthcare to domestic security. Medical statistics show that
for the last 12–14 years problem-use is relevant to 90% of users from this group and
the death rate is excessively high (probably around 3% per year).
Experience worldwide has established that this type of use is hard to register via
population surveys. Therefore, this assessment incorporates comparison of data from
all kinds of sources like police statistics, drug care NGOs servicing heroin addicts,
medical statistics, etc.
The proportion of positive answers by 15 to 30 year-old respondents to the
January 2003 population survey direct question “Do you use heroin?” was 0.2%. This
is roughly 3,300 people who can be defined as users. Yet the relatively small number
of respondents gives no sufficient empirical basis for drawing conclusions.
As to the subgroups of those having tried heroin 0.2% of all respondents
throughout the country give positive replies, i.e. a total of 12,000–14,000 people
(Table 8 and Figure 11).
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Table 7. Last-year and last-month prevalence 
among students 
Sofia, 2000 Plovdiv, 2002 
During the During the During the During the
last 12 months last 30 days last 12 months last 30 days
Amphetamines 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4
Ecstasy 1.2 0.6 1.8 0.7
Table 6. Lifetime prevalence among students 
Sofia, 2000 Plovdiv, 2002 
Amphetamines 2.0 1.2
Ecstasy 2.1 2.9
Source: Vitosha Research
Source: Vitosha Research
A supplementary question allowing
for a large-scale assessment of heroin
users was: “Would you try if you were
offered”? and 0.5% declared they had
already tried. This is equivalent to about
32,000–34,000 people. The results with
other indirect questions such as “How
many of your friends and acquaintances
have tried or are using heroin?” are similar
(Table 8).
Comparison between these figures
and data by local police departments
and NGOs implementing treatment
programs for heroin addicts leads to the
conclusion that the number of heroin
users to date is between 15,000 and
25, 000 people. Experts and researchers,
however, do not agree on the level of
problem heroin use.
Assessment of the number of heroin
users should take into account the post-
2000 symptoms that the heroin
epidemic is subsiding. The strongest
evidence in this respect is the values of
variables like “average age of those
seeking treatment” and “average age of
the first-time use of the basic
substance” (Figure 12).
Registrations under NGO harm
reduction programs,75 as well as police
statistics, also confirm the above data.
Another hypothesis was advanced in a
study assessing dependent drug users
according to the number of people
having sought help at medical institution
across the country; it identified the years
1999–2000 as the peak of the heroin
epidemic (Figure 13).
As already mentioned, the number of
problem heroin users is extremely hard
to pinpoint, the most reliable data being
the number of people seeking heroin
dependency treatment and, the death
rate among dependent heroin users.
75 Programs for exchange of needles and syringes: Initiative for Health (Sofia), Panacea Foundation
(Plovdiv), Dose of Love Association (Bourgas), 21st century Foundation (Pleven).
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Table 8. Heroin (January 2003,%)
15+ 15–30 
Tried before Using now Tried before Using now
Direct estimate of heroin 0.2 – 0.3 0,2
Indirect estimate of heroin 0.5 n.a. 0.7 n.a.
34 000
Respondents that 
"have tried" heroin 
Respondents that 
"use heroin"
14 0003 300
Respondents that to have tried
inderect questions
Figure 11. Structure of heroin users according to direct 
and indirect questions
Source: National Drug–addiction Center 
23
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Average age of those seeking treatment
Average age of the first try
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Figure 12. Average age of the first-time use of those
seeking treatment
Source: Vitosha Research
Source: Vitosha Research
According to official data of MoI’s
Press Office,76 a total of 57 Bulgarian
citizens died of overdose in 1999 (the
number of those aged 14 -18 was 11, those
between 19 and 30 were 44, and those
aged 30 + were 2). In year 2000 the
number of people who died of overdose
rose to 102.77 According to a survey of
the Center for Social Studies, the death
rate for 2001 was 75 people who died of
overdose or low quality drugs. The
number of drug users who passed away
in 2002 was 17 people.78
The heroin epidemic peak is also
backed up by NCA data on “first time
treatment seekers” demonstrating peak
values for the year 1999 (Table 9). The
information provides an indirect
estimate of the dynamics of problem
heroin users’ share.
NCA data also corroborates three
main trends:
• The percentage of persons injecting
heroin and other opiates varies from
95% to 98% of all people seeking
treatment.
• The percentage of persons injecting
heroin and other opiates on a daily
basis is between 78% and 90% of all
people seeking treatment.
• The relative percentage of persons
injecting heroin and other opiates is
between 74% and 81% of all people
seeking treatment.
76 A comparison between this trend and death rate figures for dependent drug (mostly heroin) users is
nearly impractical. The National Statistical Institute provides incomplete data on drug induced death,
so the figures used here are taken from MoI announcements on various occasions. Moreover, the
latter are fragmented since the Ministry had not officially presented the statistics CSD asked for until
the publication of this study.
77 2002 Annual Report of the National Drug Council.
78 Tema magazine, 26 August 2002.
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Figure 13. Indirect estimate of the number of heroin 
users in the period 1990–2000 through
comparison of police notifications and number
of drug users seeking emergency treatment
12Table 9. Comparative data on treatment seekers in Sofia 
in the period 1997–2001 (%)
Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percentage of first-time treatment seekers 46.0 43.0 49.0 38.0 43.0
Percentage of male treatment seekers 82.0 81.0 76.0 79.0 83.0
Percentage of persons seeking treatment in 
relation to heroin or other opiates use 95.0 97.0 97.0 98.0 96.0
Percentage of persons using drugs on a 
daily basis 81.0 90.0 78.0 90.0 85.0
Percentage of persons injecting basic 
substance 74.0 81.0 74.0 78.0 76.0
Source: National Center for Addictions
Source: CSD Estimation
Certain at-risk groups of the heroin market should be categorized:
The first group is high school students. The data at our disposal indicates that the
direct and indirect estimates of high school students who have used heroin, i.e.,
lifetime prevalence for that group is between seven to nine times higher than the
country average. Indirect estimates lead to the conclusion that the concentration of
heroin consumption among high school students is much higher than the average of
the at-risk group of people aged 15–30. Surveys of the National Center for Addictions
carried among students in Sofia and Plovdiv also back up this data (Table 10).
A mechanism worth dwelling upon is
the risk concentration in suburban
schools in larger cities. In-depth
interviews with dependent drug users
and experts have shown that it is a
regular practice in the leading schools in
Sofia and other big cities to banish any
students suspected of drug use without
seeking support from the competent
bodies in order to avoid publicity. Thus, 
the problem students are compelled to move to inferior schools in suburban areas where
they are usually coerced into drug use by actual addicts in order to secure resources
for the heroin the latter might need. Organized crime’s effort to maintain “zones of
permanent use,” slackened parental control, and the negligence of enforcement
bodies in the outer city are additional factors that spawn crisis spots for the ingress of
heroin.
The second at-risk group is the Roma population, particularly so in certain regions
of Bulgaria. The Roma minority presents 30% to 40% of all participants registered
under harm reduction programs (also known as exchange of needles and syringes) in
Sofia and Plovdiv. A similar percentage of Roma occupy police records of detained
persons. Data about this community from NGOs based in Varna also testifies to a very
high penetration rate.
A Friedrich Ebert Foundation funded survey among Roma aged 12 to 29 from
Sofia, Plovdiv, Vidin, Blagoevgrad, Pleven, and Pazardzhik confirms the high risks
among this minority.79
Likewise, 12% of all participants in the methadone program of the National
Center for Addictions are of Roma origin. The penetration rate is thus higher than the
country average, since according to the 2001 census the percentage of the Roma
population was 4.6%.
79 See http://www.fes.bg/library/2003/Narkomanite_sastojanie_spezifika.zip
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Table 10. High school students using heroin
Lifetime Last-year Last-month
prevalence prevalence prevalence
Sofia, 2000 2.1 1.1 0.5
Plovdiv, 2002 1.3 0.7 0.4
Source: National Center for Addictions
Considering NGO and police data on addiction risk among the Roma, certain
specific features should be noted. For instance, the number of heroin addicted Roma
in Bourgas, the country’s fourth biggest city, is rather low despite generally high
heroin dependency rates. Such variations are observable in other cities, too, Sofia
being a case in point. High overall penetration rates co-occur with Roma
neighborhoods where heroin spread is insignificant. In towns like Pleven and Dobrich
the share of Roma addicts is as low as 8–10%, while in others such as Pazardzhik,
Sliven, Vidin, and Kyustendil the Roma communities are strongly affected.
Regrettably, there are no precise figures available.
As the epidemic has subsided, heroin usage rates among the Roma have also
dropped. The intolerance to drug diffusion of the Roma community itself is the main
cause of such reduction. Resistance is practiced in one of two ways: either through
ostracism of the hooked family member, who is banished from the neighborhood or
sent to live with kinsmen in rural areas with no access to heroin, or through the
influence of Roma leaders who can bar both dealers and addicts from the
neighborhood.
3.4. THE USE OF COCAINE, LSD, ANABOLIC STEROIDS, AND INHALANTS 
Experts maintain that the use of psychoactive substances, not included in the three
groups described above, is much more infrequent. With some substances, however,
relatively high consumption occurs, as is evident from the two population surveys.
Cocaine is the best proof. Most
experts agree that because of its high
price the drug is rarely used. The two
population surveys, however, record a
substantial usage rate for a country the
size of Bulgaria. The share of
respondents replying positively to the
question “Do you personally know any
people who use (cocaine)?” was 1.5%,
while replies to the question about
trying among people aged 15–30 show
that penetration levels are indeed high
(Table 11).
All sources are consistent, however, that regular use prevails with specific elite
circles of crime and prostitution.
The survey also registers the high usage of anabolic steroids, in particular by the
age group of 15 to 30. Experts interpret this as sports related consumption. Bulgarian
law is notoriously liberal regarding steroids.
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Table 11. Use of cocaine, hallucinogens, anabolic 
steroids and inhalants (January 2003,%)
15+ 15–30 
Tried before Using now Tried before Using now
Cocaine 0.1 – 0.5 0.5 
Hallucinogens (LSD, etc.) 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 
Anabolic steroids 0.2 – 0.5 0.5
Inhalants 0.1 – 0.2 0.2
Source: Vitosha Research
As far as hallucinogens are concerned, very low values are recorded by the
surveys. LSD is imported in small quantities comparable to ecstasy and is rarely used
beyond the importer’s circle  of friends. LSD might abound among trance music fans,
for instance, yet the team failed to find particular groups of population frequently
using the drug.
”Psychonauts” with preferences to strong hallucinogens would rather use drugs
that are cheaper and easier to get, mostly of vegetable extraction. They also believe
that synthetic drugs carry greater risks and are therefore inclined to “natural”
hallucinogens. Nevertheless, experiment-driven youth are not held back by such
considerations in their choice, but will consume any drug having a similar effect, from
thorn apple seeds to ketamine.
Parkisan pills are ever more rarely used nowadays, and when they are, they are
taken predominantly by younger high school students with no access to other drugs.
Inhalants use that was fairly widely spread even prior to 1990 is now rather low as
the surveys show. These drugs, commonly used by minors of Roma origin, have most
probably been replaced by heroin.
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4. CONCLUSION
A number of transformations have taken place in Bulgaria as this society has
become aware of the challenge of drug use. Public opinion has obliged institutions to
take resolute measures for curbing the drug market, among them amendments to
legislation, institution of the National Drugs Council, and adoption of the National
Anti-Drug Strategy 2002-2008.
Bulgarian institutions are presently implementing a variety of programs on almost
all aspects of narcotic drugs demand and supply. However, the state’s financial and
human resources are insufficient to successfully tackle the whole gamut of drug
issues. The authors of this report believe that the most severe problems should be
made a priority. The present analysis has helped draft several guidelines for effective
counteraction of the drugs market.
• Expanding the methadone program. Although the program started back in 1995,
by mid-2003 it has treated as few as 300 people, and has not been applied outside
of the capital, Sofia. Despite high public attention it is practically “closed” for new
participants. The reasons seem to be no other than the mercenary interests of
individuals and institutions. The program is notably inexpensive (expenses for an
average daily dose of methadone per participant amounting to 0.60–0.80 BGN).
If all willing individuals were allowed to join it, hundreds of people could be saved
and thousands would leave the drug market. Hopefully, this would administer a
blow to drug organizations and improve the crime situation in the country,
especially for those offenses usually committed by drug users in pursuit of their
daily dose (house burglary, car theft, robbery). According to some estimates, the
number of potential participants in Sofia is between 2,000 and 3,000 people
(which is one third to a half of all heroin addicts). The group could expand to
4,000–6,000 if participants from other big cities are included.
• Centralizing the anti-drug effort. Division into numerous scattered units is a
problem not restricted to enforcement bodies. Lack of coordination could be
overcome if the long-awaited agency—which would integrate the of the efforts of
police and special services—is actually established. 
• Closing the “open doors” along the borders of Bulgaria. Certain points of entry
into the country such as Varna, Bourgas, and a few smaller border-crossing points
are letting shipments into the country without applying regular control. Installing
X-Ray security at the points of busiest commodity flow would lessen the risk of
drugs and precursors penetration.
• Introducing a system for institutional efficiency, monitoring, and control at the
agencies dealing with drug diffusion, prevention and treatment. At present, there
is little clarity about the way of assessing the efficiency of responsible institutions,
or the success/failure of particular measures.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Investigation of Demand 
When the CSD project was launched, drug demand was an underinvestigated
area. Therefore, it was necessary to gather information through the course of the
project. The basic sources used were two series of in-depth interviews between
September 2002 and September 2003. The first group included 30 interviews with
civil organizations and doctors treating drug addicts. The second included long-term
heroin users, second and third level dealers, police and special service officers
(50 interviews). The interviews with persons identifying themselves as possessing
drugs and willing to share key information (namely, second, third and fourth level
dealers and senior officers) were conducted by two members of the research team.
Interviewers that had to tackle second and third level dealers were selected to match
special criteria previously defined by the team so that they could manage the
complexity of the task. Second, third, and fourth level dealers were accessed after a
preparation stage through the intermediary of people close to the dealers.
There were also some supplementary sources of information:
• Press conferences, press releases, and special reports published by local and
national police departments as well as by special services and civil organizations.
• Articles and investigative journalism. Over 4,000 articles from the period after
1992 and especially those after 1996 were analyzed.
Sociological Assessment of Demand
The first surveys of drug use in Bulgaria appeared in the mid 1990s. They were
primarily targeted at high school students in the biggest cities. Most of them are rather
probing than population surveys. In the period 1999–2001 the first population
surveys were again conducted among high school students in the bigger cities. The
outcomes allow for an assessment of some of the most endangered groups, yet they
do not provide information about drugs use and abuse throughout the country.
Types of Surveys on Psychoactive Substance Use 
The following types of surveys on psychoactive substance use have been
conducted up to the present moment:
Probing surveys among students – they cover different regions and age groups and
give a general overview of the situation and trends of drug use among high school
students, but they don’t have any representative value.
Population surveys among students—up to now, several such surveys of different
age groups or regions have been carried out, two of them providing reliable and
comparable information about psychoactive substance use:
➢ “Use of psychoactive drugs among high school students in Sofia”—the survey
comprised 1,398 students from 9 to 12 grade in Sofia schools during the period
May-June 2002. It was conducted by the National Center for Addictions and
the Prevention and Treatment Centre for Drug Addicts in Sofia and is
representative for high school students in Sofia aged 15–19.
➢ “Students and Psychoactive Substances: Use, Trends and Problems–Plovdiv 2002”.
The survey was wider in scope, comprising 1,533 students from 6 to 12 grade,
between the ages of 12 and 19. A double cluster sample was used to select
74 classes in 39 general and vocational schools in different parts of the city.
Students were surveyed thoroughly via a direct group anonymous
questionnaire. Field work was performed in the period December 2002 –
January 2003. The survey was performed by the National Center for Addictions
in cooperation with the Municipal Drugs Council in Plovdiv.
Population Surveys on Psychoactive Substance Use Among the Adult Population of the
Country for Specific Age Groups (for instance the 15–30 group):
➢ “National Survey “Youth–2000” of the National Public Opinion Center
provided data on young people’s attitude to the decriminalization of soft drugs.
➢ “National Population Survey in Bulgaria on Psychoactive Substance Use and Abuse”
conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research in
the period December 2002–January 2003. This was the first national population
survey providing information not only about the country’s population as a
whole, but also about young people aged 15–30 as the most endangered
group.
➢ “National Population Survey in Bulgaria on Psychoactive Substance Use and Abuse”
conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research in
the period June–July 2003. It followed the methodology of the European
Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and is the first
survey in the country that can be used for comparisons in an international
context.
Qualitative Surveys—these provide additional and detailed information on
attitudes and practices of certain groups of current and potential psychoactive
drug users.
åÂthodology of National Surveys, Conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research 
While taking into account many different viewpoints, the team of authors has
attempted to find common ground for an assessment of the actual drug consumption
in the country. For this reason, the first national population survey on psychoactive
drug use and abuse was conducted. Even if population-based surveys are often
unreliable due to stigmatized and hidden patterns of drug use, they are the type of
surveys that provide a comprehensive representation of the situation in the country
as well as reference material for later in-depth studies. 
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➢ “National Population Survey in Bulgaria on Psychoactive Substance Use and Abuse”
December 2002 – January 2003. The survey used two separate samples. The first
sample was representative for the total population aged 15 and above (N = 823),
while the second sample was representative for the age group 15–30 (N = 1098).
The type of sample used was a double cluster sample, while the survey method
was standardized face-to-face interview. Some highlights of the survey content
were the penetration rate, the prevalence, the attitudes to use and abuse of the different
types of narcotic substances. 
Two groups of questions were used to answer the main inquiry about the number
of psychoactive substance users:
• Direct standardized questions to which only a portion of present and one-time
users would reply and admit to using the particular groups of drugs. Experts who
drafted the questions were fully aware that asking directly about use and addiction
could not be effective even in countries with high drug use rates and liberal
legislation on soft drugs. Yet such questions have become standard since they
allow an objective estimate of the size of the user group. Moreover, the team
developing the tools has forecasted that in the long run the information gathered
through these questions could be used for comparative purposes. Another reason
was their comparability to similar surveys in European and American countries
with traditions in that field.
• Indirect questions. It was assumed that respondents would more easily reply to
questions about psychoactive drugs use of friends and acquaintances than about
their own practices.
➢ “National Population Survey in Bulgaria on Psychoactive Substance Use and Abuse”
June – July 2003. This has been the second national population-based survey
carried out by CSD and Vitosha Research this year. It differs from the first one in
its use of the exact questions developed by EMCDDA, thus being good grounds
for longitudinal and international comparisons. It comprised 1,057 respondents
aged 18 and above, which should be taken into account when comparing results
from the two studies. The type of sample used was double cluster sample, while
the survey method was standardized face-to-face interview.
➢ In addition, two qualitative surveys were conducted. The first one covered
dependent heroin users and regular soft drug users, while the second one comprised
experts and drug care workers.
The surveys carried out in the country up to now are evidently heterogeneous,
varying as to methods and scope. This impedes comparisons and requires that data
interpretation reflects each surveys specific features and scope.
It is common practice of the mass media to take unfair advantage of survey
findings and extrapolate concrete data (representative for high school students for
instance) to make inferences about the population as a whole. It should once again
be underscored that all surveys quoted in this study should be referred exclusively to
the portion of society that has been surveyed avoiding any generalizations about the
overall population.
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APPENDIX 2: THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS IN BULGARIA: LEGISLATIVE, 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
1. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A number of legislative acts regulating the various aspects of narcotic drugs control
have been adopted in Bulgaria since the late 1990s.
1.1. Narcotic drugs control and the applicable Bulgarian legislation 
1. LAW on Drugs and Precursors Control 
(Promulgated in State Gazette No. 30 of 2.04.1999, effective as of 3.10.1999,
amended SG No. 63 of 1.08.2000, No. 74 of 30.07.2002, No. 75 of 2.08.2002,
effective as of 2.08.2002, amended and supplemented, No. 120 of 29.12.2002,
effective as of 29.12.2002, No. 56 of 20.06.2003)
2. ORDINANCE ‹ 7 of 26.01.2001 on the terms and conditions of issuing permits for
import and export of drugs and their chemicals. 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 11 of
6.02.2001)
3. ORDINANCE ‹ 9 of 15.02.2001 on the terms of granting permission to perform
the activities under Art. 73 of the Law on Drugs and Precursors Control 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 17 of
23.02.2001, supplemented, No. 42 of 9.05.2003, effective as of 9.05.2003)
4. ORDINANCE ‹ 20 of 10.05.2001 on the terms and conditions under which
chemicals containing drugs and precursors may be relieved from certain control
measures 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 49 of
29.05.2001).
5. ORDINANCE ‹ 21 of 12.10.2000 on the requirements to the documents and
accountability for conducting activities with narcotic drugs and their chemicals 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 86 of
20.10.2000, effective as of 20.10.2000).
6. ORDINANCE ‹ 24 of 31.10.2000 on the terms and conditions for implementing
substitution and maintenance harm reduction programs for persons dependent
on narcotic d rugs 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 91 of
7.11.2000).
7. ORDINANCE on precursors control 
(Adopted with Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 104 of 6.06.2000, promulgated in
State Gazette, No. 48 of 13.06.2000, amended, No. 4 of 12.01.2001)
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8. ORDINANCE on the terms and conditions for expert testing of confiscated drugs
and precursors 
(Adopted with Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 142 of 25.07.2000, promulgated in
State Gazette, No. 63 of 1.08.2000, effective as of 1.08.2000, amended, No. 4 of
12.01.2001)
9. ORDINANCE on the terms and conditions for issuing licenses for activities with
drugs for medical and veterinary purposes under appendices ‹ 2 and 3 to Art. 3,
Par. 2 of the Law on Drugs and Precursors Control 
(Adopted with Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 199 of 27.09.2000, promulgated in
State Gazette, No. 81 of 6.10.2000, effective as of 7.01.2001, amended and
supplemented, No. 24 of 14.03.2003 )
10. ORDINANCE on the terms and conditions for confiscation, storage, destruction
and referral for scientific research of narcotic drugs and plants and extraction of
demonstrative samples from these 
(Adopted with Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 37 of 24.03.2000 „., promulgated
in State Gazette, No. 26 of 29.03.2000, amended, No. 4 of 12.01.2001)
11. INSTRUCTION ‹ 2 of 17.05.2001 on the storage procedure for narcotic drugs
and precursors under appendices ‹ 2, 3 and 4 of the Law on Drugs and
Precursors Control in case of termination of activities, revocation or expiration of
licenses 
(Issued by the Minister of Finance, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 60 of
6.07.2001).
12. RULES on the organization and activities of the National Drugs Council 
(Adopted with Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 10/17.01.2001, promulgated in
State Gazette, No. 8 of 26.01.2001)
13. ORDINANCE ‹ 3 of 10 January 2001 on the destruction of legally produced,
acquired and stored drugs and their chemicals which are unfit for use 
(Issued by the Minister of Health, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 6 of
19.01.2001, amended and supplemented, No. 11 of 5.02.2003)
14. RULES on the functions, tasks and organizational structure of the National Center
for Addictions
(Appendix to Art. 2 of Council of Ministers Decree ‹ 69 of 19.03.2001,
promulgated in State Gazette, No. 29 of 27.03.2001)
1.2. International Anti-Drug Instruments of which Bulgaria Is a Party 
Bulgaria is a party to all basic international and EU anti-drug instruments/acts,
namely:
1. SINGLE CONVENTION on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, and the Protocol of 1972
amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(Ratified by Decree ‹ 634 of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the
Republic of Bulgaria of 22.08.1968 – State Gazette, No. 67 of 1968, effective for
the Republic of Bulgaria as of 24.11.1968. Law of the National Assembly of
12.01.1994 on the withdrawal of the reservation under Art. 48, Item 2 – No. 8 of
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27.01.1994. The Reservation was withdrawn on 6.05.1994. Issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, promulgated in State Gazette, No. 87 of 15.10.1996. Effective
for the Republic of Bulgaria as of 17.08.1996 – date of coming in force of the
Protocol of 1972 – State Gazette, No. 86 of 1996)
2. United Nations CONVENTION against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances
(Adopted by the conference on its 6th plenary session on 19 December 1988.
Ratified by a Law of the National Assembly of 15.07.1992 – State Gazette, No. 60
of 24.07.1992. Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, promulgated in State
Gazette, No. 89 of 19.10.1993, effective for Bulgaria as of 23.12.1992, amended,
No. 58 of 29.06.2001)
3. EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Communities
and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the
other part 
(Ratified by a law adopted by the 36th National Assembly on 15.04.1993 – State
Gazette, No. 33 of 20.04.1993, effective as of 1.02.1995. The text of the
Agreement was published as a supplement of State Gazette on 25.05.1995 – State
Gazette, No. 61 of 7.07.1995)
1.3. Criminal Aspects of Curbing Drug Abuse 
The Bulgarian Criminal Code contains a number of provisions that have been
altered in significant ways since 1975, especially via the latest amendments in 2000
and 2002, incriminating acts that violate regulations on narcotic drugs, their
analogues or precursors, including participation in crime groups. 
CRIMINAL CODE (excerpt)
Art. 93. The words and expressions indicated below shall be construed for the
purpose of this Code to mean the following:
…
16. (New – SG, No. 21/ 2000) “Narcotic drugs” are all narcotic and psychotropic
substances - high-risk and risk under the provisions of the Law on Drugs and
Precursors Control.
17. (New – SG, No. 21/2000, supplemented., No. 92/2002) “Precursor” is any
substance under the provisions of the Law on Drugs and Precursors Control and
any substance under the Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
Control of Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors.
18. (New – SG, No. 21/2000, supplemented, No. 92/ 2002) “Illegal trafficking” is
any illegal activity or acts related to plants containing narcotic substances and
precursors, to biological, chemical or radiological weapons, to explosives,
radioactive materials, toxic and chemical substances and their precursors, or to
biological agents and toxins.
19. (New – SG, No. 21/2000) “Analogue” is any substance not included in the
Law on Drugs and Precursors Control but having similar chemical structure to that
of a narcotic drug and inducing analogous effects in the human body.
20. (New – SG, No. 92/ 2002) “Organized crime group” is a structured permanent
association of three or more people with the purpose of jointly perpetrating a
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crime within the country or abroad which is punished by deprivation of liberty for
more than three years and which purports material gains. The association is also
structured without the existence of formal division of functions between
members, length of participation or a developed structure.
* * * * *
Art. 321. (1) (As amended – SG, No. 92/2002) A person who forms or leads an
organized crime group, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for three to ten
years.
(2) (As amended – SG, No. 92/2002) A person who takes part in such a group shall
be punished by deprivation of liberty for one to six years.
(3) (New – SG, No. 62/1997, as amended, No. 21/2000, No. 92/2002) Where the
group is armed or organised with a view to committing crimes under Art. 243,
244, 253, 280, 337, Art. 339, Par. 1–4, Art. 354‡, Par. 1 and 2, Art. 354b, Par. 1–4
and Art. 354c, Par. 1, or an official takes part in it, the punishment shall be:
1. under Par. (1) – deprivation of liberty from five to fifteen years;
2. under Par. (2) – deprivation of liberty from three to ten years.
(4) (New – SG, No. 62/997) A member of the group shall not be punished ,
provided he surrenders voluntarily to the authorities and discloses everything that
may be of his knowledge about the group, before the commitment of a crime by
such person or by the group.
(5) (New – SG, No. 62/1997) A member of the group who surrenders voluntarily
to the authorities and discloses everything of his knowledge about the group, thus
facilitating the detection and proof of crimes committed by the group, shall be
punished pursuant to Article 55.
(6) (New – SG, No. 92/2002) A person who conspires with one or more other
persons to perpetrate a within the country or abroad crime which is punished by
deprivation of liberty for more than three years and which is aimed at achieving
material gains or illegal influence over an authority or a local self-government
body shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for up to six years.
* * * * *
Art. 354‡. (New - SG, No. 95/1975) (1) (As amended – SG, No. 10/1993, No. 62/1997,
No. 21/2000) A person who without due permission produces, processes,
acquires, spreads, stores, holds, transports or transfers narcotic drugs or analogues
thereof, shall be punished for high-risk narcotic drugs by deprivation of liberty for
ten to fifteen years and a fine of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand
Bulgarian Leva, and for risk narcotic drugs by deprivation of liberty for three to
fifteen years and a fine of fifty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand
Bulgarian Leva.
(2) (As amended – SG, No. 28/1982, No. 10 /1993, No. 62 /1997, No. 21/2000)
Should the crime under paragraph (1) be committed:
1. with regard to sizeable amounts of substances;
2. by two or more persons who have conspired in advance;
3. with regard to substances spread among more than two persons or in a public
place or in proximity to a school, dormitory or barracks within 250 meters of their
premises;
4. by a medical doctor, pharmacist, tutor, teacher, school principal or an official
at a penitentiary institution;
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5. for a second time, the punishment shall be deprivation of liberty for fifteen to
twenty years and a fine of two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand
Bulgarian Leva for high-risk narcotic drugs, and deprivation of liberty for ten to
twenty years and a fine of fifty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand
Bulgarian Leva for risk narcotic drugs.
(3) (As amended – SG, No. 21/2000) A person dependent on narcotic drugs or
analogues thereof shall not be punished in case the amount this person acquires,
stores, keeps, transports or carries is intended for one-time use.
(4) (Repealed – SG, No. 21/2000).
(5) (As amended – SG, No. 62/1997) A person who violates the rules established
for the production, acquisition, safekeeping, accounting, prescribing, transporting
or carrying of narcotic substances, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for
up to five years and a fine of one thousand to five thousand Bulgarian Leva, and
the court may also rule deprivation of rights under Art. 37, items 6 and 7.
(6) (As amended – SG, No. 21 ÓÚ 2000 „.) In the cases under paragraphs (1)
through (3) the object of the crime shall be confiscated in favour of the state.
Art. 354b. (New – SG, No. 95/1975) (1) (As amended – SG, No. 62/1997, No.
21/2000) A person who persuades or helps another to use narcotic substances
and/or analogues thereof shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for one to ten
years and a fine of one thousand to five thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(2) (As amended – SG, No. 62/1997, No. 21/2000) Where the act under Par. (1)
has been committed:
1. with regard to minors, underage or unanswerable persons;
2. with regard to more than one person;
3. by a medical doctor, pharmacist, tutor, teacher, school principal or an official
at a penitentiary institution;
4. by an owner or leaseholder of a hotel, restaurant, discotheque or another
public establishment;
5. through the mass media or in any other similar manner in a public place;
6. for a second time, the punishment shall be deprivation of liberty for five to
fifteen years and a fine of fifty thousand to one hundred thousand Bulgarian Leva,
and with sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 the court may also rule deprivation of rights
under Article 37, sub-paragraphs 6 and 7.
(3) (New – SG, No. 21/2000) A person who provides another with a narcotic drug
and/or analogue thereof in quantities likely to cause death and death actually
occurs shall be punished by deprivation of liberty from ten to thirty years and a
fine of three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(4) (As amended – SG, No. 10/1993, No. 62 /1997, former -paragraph 3, No. 21
/2000) A person who systematically places premises at the disposal of different
people for taking of narcotic drugs or organises the use of suchdrugs, shall be
punished by deprivation of liberty from five to twelve years and a fine of five
thousand to twenty thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(5) (As amended – SG, No. 10/1993, No. 62 /1997, former Par. 4, No. 21/2000) A
medical doctor who, without being necessary, consciously prescribes to another
person narcotic drugs or medicines containing suchdrugs, shall be punished by
deprivation of liberty for up to five years and by a fine of up to three thousand
Bulgarian Leva, and the court may also rule deprivation of rights under Article 37,
sub-paragraphs 6 and 7.
(6) (Former Par. 5 – SG, No. 21/2000) If the act under the preceding paragraph
has been repeated, the punishment shall be deprivation of liberty for up to three
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years and deprivation of rights under Article 37, items 6 and 7.
Art. 354c. (New – SG, No. 95/1975, As amended, No. 62/1997, No. 21/2000) (1)
A person who in violation of the rules established in the Law on Drugs and
Precursors Control sows or cultivates opium poppy, coca plant or any variety of
the hemp plant shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for three to five years
and a fine of five thousand to ten thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(2) A person who organizes, runs and/or funds a crime group for cultivation of
plants under the above paragraph or a group for the extraction, production,
preparation, making or processing of narcotic substances shall be punished by
deprivation of liberty for twenty to thirty years or life imprisonment and a fine of
three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(3) A person who participates in a crime group under the above paragraph shall
be punished by deprivation of liberty for three to ten years and a fine of five
thousand to ten thousand Bulgarian Leva.
(4) A member of a crime group shall not be punished provided he voluntarily
discloses to the authorities all facts and circumstances of his knowledge
concerning the crime group’s activities.
(5) In minor cases under Par. (1) the punishment shall be deprivation of liberty for
up to one year and a fine of up to one thousand Bulgarian Leva.
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The legislation on narcotic drugs control has served as a foundation of the relevant
institutions and structures. 
2.1. National Drugs Council 
This is a body with the Council of Ministers implementing the national policy
against drug abuse and drugs trafficking. Its chairman is the Minister of Health, the
deputies are MoI’s Secretary General and the Deputy Minister of Justice; the Council
also has a Secretary and regular members.
The membership comprises representatives of the Presidency, the Supreme Court
of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Prosecution Office of
Cassation, the National Investigation Service and other interested ministries and
institutions (the deputy ministers of finance, of education and science, of economy,
of labor and social policy, of foreign affairs, of defense, of agriculture and forestry, of
transport and communications, the Director of the Customs Agency, the Head of the
National Service for Combating Organized Crime, the Director of the National Police
Service, the Chairman of the State Agency for Youth and Sports, the Head of the
National Center for Addictions, the Executive Director of the Bulgarian Drug Agency,
the Head of the National Drugs Service.)
Depending in the issues to be discussed, NGOs and other organizations can also
participate at NDC’s sittings. 
NDC is a permanent body convening at least four times per year. It has a
functioning board of experts that makes scientific and medical assessments of
proposals to include new plants and substances in the Law on Drugs and Precursors
Control or exclude or transfer them from one of its annexes to another. It has 7
members contributing with their expertise in medicine, pharmacology and
chemistry; members are selected upon proposal from Council members and after a
decision of the Council.
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NDC’s Chairman represents the Council, chairs its sessions and is in charge of its
overall operation, submits to the Council of Ministers various proposals and inquiries
related to the Council’s activities, signs the minutes of the Council’s sittings, appoints
the Secretary and the Secretariat members.
The NDC Secretariat prepares the sittings, coordinates the implementation of
decisions, and supervises the work of the expert groups under Art. 14, Par. 1 of the
Law on Drugs and Precursors Control, coordinates the activities of the Municipal
Drugs Councils.
The Council Secretary is assisted by a Secretariat.
Drug Councils are established in the municipalities, developing and implementing
programs for curbing drug abuse and drugs trafficking in compliance with the national
programs under Art. 11, sub-paragraph 2 of the Law on Drugs and Precursors Control
and propose to municipal councils the budget for the municipal policy in that area.
They are accountable to the National Drugs Council.
2.2. Interdepartmental Precursor Control Commission 
Its creation was envisaged in the last amendments to the Law on Drugs and
Precursors Control (of 2003) and was established with the Ministry of Economy, the
minister being its chairman and officials from the ministries of health, finance, interior
and justice – its members.
The Commission exercises control over the production, processing, use in other
industries, storage, trading, import, export, re-export and transit of the precursors and
over the implementation of Art. 12 of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Precursors control functions are assigned to the regional administrations. The
particular officials in charge of these functions locally are appointed by an order of
the regional governor.
2.3. National Center for Addictions
NCA is a legal entity attached to the Minister of Health with its headquarters in
Sofia, which coordinates and provides methodological support for drug abuse
prevention and treatment, harm reduction and rehabilitation of drug addicted or
dependent persons, specialized control over the treatment process, scientific and
applied research activities and post-graduate training of medical and non-medical
staff.
NCA is run by a Director approving its structure and the positions of the payroll
personnel, following the approval of the Minister of Health.
NCA exercises the following functions: coordination and methodological
guidance on drug abuse and addiction-related problems, including preventive
actions, treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusing or dependent persons;
specialized control over the treatment process of drug abusing or dependent persons;
provision of expertise on drug addiction.
NCA applies the above through programs for prevention and prophylaxis of drug
abuse among various groups of the population, on a national, regional and municipal
level in pursuance to the national Strategy for Combating Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking in Drugs and Precursors under Art. 11, sub-paragraph. 1 of the Law on
Drugs and Precursors Control; development and application of preventive,
treatment, educational and rehabilitation methods and techniques; delivery of
prophylactic, diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitation services to drug abusing and
dependent persons; maintenance of a register of treatment facilities offering
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substitution and maintenance programs to drug addicted persons; maintenance of a
national register of patients enlisted in such programs; issuance of documents
relevant to the fulfillment of its obligations under the legislation concerning narcotic
drugs and precursors; drafting of drugs and precursors-related legislative acts;
scientific and applied research in the field of drug addiction; clinical testing of
medication and medical equipment to check compliance with national legal
provisions; collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information on drug
addiction; post-graduate addiction-related training of medical and non-medical staff;
student training on the basis of contracts with universities; international cooperation
on drug-related issues; organization of national and international scientific events on
the problem of drug addiction.
3. NATIONAL ANTI-DRUG POLICY 
Despite the adoption of a number of regulations, the institutions of bodies to
control and curb drugs distribution and the accomplishment of certain anti-drug
initiatives, a global, consistent and well-coordinated national drug policy is yet to be
formulated. The fight against drugs was placed on a long-term strategic basis no
earlier that 2003.
3.1. The National Program for Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addictions in the Republic 
of Bulgaria, 2001 – 2005.
The program was adopted in March 2001. It was based on the experience of the
developed countries in Europe and North America in such activities and was in full
compliance with the adopted Drugs Strategy and Program of the European
Community (2000 – 2004).
Its main goal is to curb drug abuse and diffusion as well as their adverse health and
social effects on Bulgarian youth.
The Program is jointly implemented by interested governmental and non-
governmental institutions such as the ministries of health, of education and science,
of labor and social policy, of defense, the State Agency for Youth and Sports, the
National Center for Addictions, medical universities, institutes and colleges and
NGOs. 
The Program is managed by the National Drugs Council and its Secretariat.
3.2. National Anti-Drug Strategy – 2003–2008 
(Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 20.02.2003) 
This is the first document to establish a comprehensive and consistent policy since
the Bulgarian Law on Drugs and Precursors Control came into effect in 1999.
Among other goals, it aims to curtail drug use through an effective treatment and
prevention system, to downsize drugs supply and diffusion, to reduce illicit trade in
chemicals (precursors) used in drugs production and to toughen border control.
Through concrete measures it seeks to improve coordination and exchange
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between relevant institutions, to promote the policy in local terms and strengthen
Municipal Drugs Councils. A national unit on drug-related operative information will
be set up to support national and international bodies in their efforts against drugs
trafficking.
3.3. Action Plan to Implement the National Anti-Drug Strategy – 2003–2008 
(Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 24.04. 2003)
The action Plan will be implemented via the concerted efforts of all ministries and
will be supported by the Central Commission for Combating the Anti-Social Behavior
of the Under-age and Minor Persons and the State Agency for Child Protection.
The Plan’s number one strategic goal is to preclude the association of more people
into drug abuse. In order to restrict the number of drug-induced incidents and
deaths, information about safe injection and drug use practices will be provided to
those already addicted. Intravenous addicts will be trained in first aid delivery. The
number of people in effective drug addiction treatment programs will be increased
twice.
Another measure targeting drug addicts completing treatment and rehabilitation
will be to enhance their job placement rate.
In terms of updating drug-related legislation acts such as the Law on MoI, the
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure regulating “under cover
operations” and “witness protection program” and the like, will be amended and
supplemented by 2005. Another step that should be undertaken is a speedy
procedure to penalize small-scale drug dealers. A coordination and analysis unit will
be set up with the MoI no later than the end of the year to steer the Strategy’s
implementation and provide early trend analysis.
By 2005 a total of 28 local prevention and information centers will be established
with the Municipal Councils.
The Action Plan’s implementation will be reported and updated on an annual
basis and reports will be submitted to the Council of Ministers every six months.
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